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"WITNESSES" IN THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE:
CRA WFORD V. WASHINGTON, NOAH WEBSTER, AND
COMPULSORY PROCESS
Randolph N. Jonakait*
Crawford v. Washington' remade the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.2
Crawford, in the majority opinion by Justice Scalia, indicated that the Court's previous
confrontation framework, as stated in Ohio v. Roberts,3 for analyzing the reliability of
out-of-court statements was wrong.4  Instead of relying on precedent, Crawford
examined what it said was the historical background of the Confrontation Clause,
5
concluding that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused.... The Sixth Amendment must be
interpreted with this focus in mind."'6 According to the majority, that historical record
also supports a second, related proposition: the Confrontation Clause "is most naturally
read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding."7
Crawford also analyzed the Confrontation Clause's text, coming to the same
conclusion that statements akin to those from an ex parte deposition or examination,
which Crawford labeled "testimonial," are the right's core concern. 8 The Court did not
* Professor, New York Law School. The author would like to thank Stephen Newman for his suggestions.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
ight... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
4. According to Crawford, the Roberts framework "conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence
on whether it falls under a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or bears 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). Crawford concluded,
"Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial
because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes." Id. at 62.
Crawford established that the Confrontation Clause applies to all testimonial hearsay statements. Id. at 68.
The Court stated: "[W]e once again reject the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only
to in-court testimony .... Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would
render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices." Id. at 50-
51.
5. See id. at 42-43 (stating: "The Constitution's text does not alone resolve this case .... We must
therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning.")
6. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
7. Id. at 54. But see id. at 73 (noting that "[i]t is an odd conclusion indeed to think that the Framers
created a cut-and-dried rule with respect to the admissibility of testimonial statements when the law during
their own time was not fully settled") (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
8. Id. at 51-52.
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define "testimonial," 9 but said that "[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations."'10 Finally, the Court concluded that the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of "testimonial" hearsay
unless the hearsay declarant is unavailable and the accused had an opportunity to cross-
examine that declarant.Il
Crawford set off a flurry of cases and commentaries grappling with the undefined
concept of "testimonial statements."' 2  The focus here is different. Whatever
"testimonial statement" means, the term clearly does not apply to all hearsay but only a
small subset of out-of-court statements that somehow bear a resemblance to those
made at a preliminary hearing examination or a deposition . 3
The central concern here lies not with the correctness of Crawford's historical
conclusions, about which much has been written and more, no doubt, will be. 4
9. See id. at 68 (stating that "[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial"').
10. Id. See infra Part I.D for a discussion of three possible definitions for "testimonial."
11. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (noting that "[w]here testimonial [hearsay] evidence is at issue,.., the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination").
12. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RicH. L. REv. 511, 526-77 (2005) (discussing what "testimonial" might
mean in Crawford and how lower courts have interpreted the term). Crawford also left open the question of
whether the old confrontation doctrine of Roberts still regulates the admission of non-testimonial hearsay.
Crawford did not expressly overrule Roberts and some statements left the door ajar for a broader confrontation
right. For example, the Court said, "the Sixth Amendment [may] not solely [be] concerned with testimonial
hearsay." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. It also indicated that prior confrontation decisions had been "largely
consistent" with the principles Crawford enunciated, and in summarizing those decisions it referred to Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), by stating that "we considered reliability factors beyond prior opportunity for
cross-examination when the hearsay statement at issue was not testimonial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. In
concluding, Crawford stated: "Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the
Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as
would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." Id. at 68.
All those statements leave open the possibility that the Clause still applies to nontestimonial hearsay. See
Mosteller, supra, at 515 ("Another issue not resolved by Crawford is what remains of the old system under
Roberts."). On the other hand, in defining "witnesses" in the Confrontation Clause as those who bear or give
testimony, the Court implied that only testimonial statements are affected by the right to confrontation. See
infra Part I.B for a complete discussion of why the definition of "witness" should include all individuals who
have "personally perceived" an event. This article assumes that after Crawford, the Confrontation Clause
places no limits on the use of nontestimonial hearsay in criminal trials.
13. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (declining to define in full the term "testimonial," but noting that at a
minimum, it refers to "prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations").
14. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 113 (2005) (maintaining that "[h]istory does
not mandate the rigid cross-examination rule that Scalia articulated in Crawford"); Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 219, 219-20, 229-32 (2005)
(stating that Crawford relied on English common law in interpreting Confrontation Clause while other
provisions of Sixth Amendment "expressly rejected English common law"); Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford
Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine? 71 BROOK. L. REv. 35, 38-39 (2005) (arguing that
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Instead, the focus here first will be on an aspect of the Court's analysis that has not
drawn much attention: its textual explication of the term "witnesses" in the
Confrontation Clause. This is followed by analyses that Crawford did not undertake,
but should have-whether Crawford's interpretive methods were consistent with the
interpretive methods for other Sixth Amendment guarantees.
Part I examines Crawford's consideration of the Sixth Amendment's text. The
Court centered on the meaning of "witnesses" in the Confrontation Clause. Relying on
Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary, Justice Scalia stated that "witnesses" are defined as
those who give or bear testimony, a definition that was used to support the conclusion
that testimonial statements are the clause's chief concern.15 Webster's dictionary,
however, also gives other plausible meanings for "witnesses" that were not discussed
by Crawford, and they would include all hearsay declarants. 16
The terms "witness" and "witnesses" also appear in parts of the Constitution
besides the Confrontation Clause, 17 most significantly in the Compulsory Process
Clause,' 8 which is a companion provision to the right of confrontation. Crawford did
not consider how its selected definition comports with these other uses. Part II of this
Article will show that Crawford's chosen meaning conflicts with the other appearances
of the term, and Part III discusses the uses of "witnesses" in the state compulsory
process and confrontation provisions that preceded the Sixth Amendment.
While Crawford assumed that the Confrontation Clause constitutionalized a
common law right, Part IV concludes that that assertion is dubious since much of the
Sixth Amendment clearly rejected the common law and constitutionalized new rights.
Crawford reached its result without considering how its conclusions meshed with other
Sixth Amendment rights. The Court interpreted confrontation as if it could be isolated
from its context, but Part IV will discuss how confrontation is part of a bundle of rights
that help to guarantee an accused the ability to present a defense and how Crawford's
analysis conflicts with the methods of interpreting these rights.
Part V shows that the Court has used a much different standard from Crawford's
for interpreting the interrelated compulsory process right, and Part VI shows that the
method of interpreting the Compulsory Process Clause serves the original purposes of
the Sixth Amendment. The Article concludes that the same standards of interpretation
should apply to both the confrontation and compulsory process provisions. If
Crawford's method of analysis is correct, many well-established Sixth Amendment
doctrines are in jeopardy. On the other hand, if the methods of interpreting other Sixth
Amendment provisions are correct, then Crawford's approach to the Confrontation
Clause must be wrong.
focusing on defendant's ability to "test adverse evidence" and trier of fact's ability to evaluate a witness'
credibility "provide[s] a foundation for developing confrontation limits on hearsay evidence" that comports
with the "original meaning" of Confrontation Clause).
15. Crawford, 541 U.S. at51.
16. For a discussion of other potentially useful definitions of"witness," see Part 1.B infra.
17. For a discussion of the use of "witnesses" in the Treason Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Constitution, see infra Part IIA-C, particularly notes 65-67.
18. The Compulsory Process Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.




The Confrontation Clause provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall ... be confronted with the witnesses against him ...."19 These words, Crawford
concluded, reflect the same focus found in its historical examination; confrontation
makes a sharp distinction between types of out-of-court statements and is acutely
concerned with only the small fragment of "testimonial" statements that are akin to ex
parte depositions or examinations. 20 The Court stated that this text
applies to "witnesses" against the accused-in other words, those who "bear
testimony." 1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language
(1828). "Testimony," in turn, is typically "[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Ibid.
... The constitutional text, like the history underlying the common-law
right of confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a
specific type of out-of-court statement.
21
Crawford presents this as a path that inevitably leads to but one destination. If you
start with the text, you must proceed to "witness," pass into "testimony," then through
"a solemn declaration," leading to a "specific type of out-of-court statement," which
turns out to be hearsay akin to that produced by ex parte depositions and
examinations.2 2 An honest textual analysis, however, would concede that this is not a
straight lane, but a journey that requires a number of choices to reach the Court's
destination. Taking any of the other plausible, lexicographic branches would lead to a
much different result from the Court's conclusion in Crawford.
A. Webster and "Confront"
Crawford's textual path started with "witness," but perhaps the first stepping
stone should be "confronted with," for that phrase seems to limit the meaning of
"witness" in the Confrontation Clause.23 Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary provides
several meanings for "confront," but the Sixth Amendment seems to use the third one:
"To set face to face; to bring into the presence of, as an accused person and a witness,
in court, for examination and discovery of the truth; followed by with."'24 Since the
Clause grants the accused the right to be "confronted with" witnesses, this seems the
appropriate definition. That conclusion is buttressed by the defined purpose for such
confrontation. The Sixth Amendment concern is not just the formalistic notion of
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
20. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-53 (2004).
21. Id. at 51.
22. Id. at 51-52.
23. Underlying this approach is an important assumption. See Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp,
Making it Up- "Original Intent" and Federal Takings Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203, 216 (2003) (arguing
that "perhaps the most important assumption that a semantic originalist makes is that it is possible for a
'person' (i.e., a judge) to engage in a thought process whereby they can apply an eighteenth century
understanding of words, and of the rights that those words generate and guarantee, to modem life").
24. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828), available at
http://www.cbtministries.org/resources/websterl 828.htm (search "confront"). The dictionary gives three other
definitions for confront: (1) "[t]o stand face to face in full view; to face; to stand in front;" (2) "[t]o stand in
direct opposition; to oppose;" (3) "[t]o set together for comparison; to compare one thing with another." Id.
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bringing witnesses within spitting distance of the accused, but also the goal of having
"examination and the discovery of the truth. '25
B. Webster and "Witnesses"
Webster did not just give one definition, as Crawford implied, but five for the
noun "witness." 26 Crawford selected the last of those meanings as the one incorporated
into the Confrontation Clause. It states, "One who gives testimony; as, the witnesses in
court agreed in all essential facts.
27
Crawford, however, simply ignored Webster's third definition of the noun
"witness," which states, "A person who knows or sees any thing; one personally
present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-witness. '28 This meaning links with
Webster's first definition of a "witness" as a transitive verb: "To see or know by
personal experience. I witnessed the ceremonies in New York, with which the
ratification of the constitution was celebrated, in 1788."29 This definition, as well as
the one Justice Scalia selected, makes sense in criminal cases. Those who bear
testimony might be the people referred to as witnesses in the Confrontation Clause, but
so too might be those who know something about a relevant event from their personal
presence. If, as in Webster's example, one who saw the ratification ceremonies was a
witness, then one who saw a shooting is also a witness.
The difference between these two definitions is not merely semantic. They
embody quite distinct epistemological concepts. Justice Scalia's selected definition
limits witnesses to only those who have done a particular act, that is, given testimony.
A person is not a witness unless and until he has somehow testified. Under the other
definition, however, a person is a witness not because of what he does but what he has
personally perceived. Under Justice Scalia's choice, a person is not a witness because
he has seen the shooting, but only if he makes testimonial statements about it. The
person who makes an offhanded remark to a friend, "I saw the defendant do the
shooting," is not a witness because he has not made a testimonial statement. 30 Utilizing
25. Id.
26. Two of the definitions refer to information, not people. While an accused can confront those who
supply information, he cannot be set face-to-face with the information. Webster's first definition of "witness"
states, "[tiestimony; attestation of a fact or event." 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English
Language, supra note 24 (search "witness"). This meaning was illustrated with this example: "If I bear
witness of myself, my witness is not true. John v." The second definition states, "That which furnishes
evidence or proof" and provides as an example: "Laban said, this heap is a witness between me and thee this
day. Genesis xxxi." Id. The remaining three definitions for the noun "witness" do refer to people, but one
clearly is not incorporated into the Sixth Amendment. It states, "One who sees the execution of an instrument,
and subscribes it for the purpose of confirming its authenticity by his testimony." Id. If the Confrontation
Clause were limited to this meaning, an accused would not even have the right to confront most in-court
witnesses.
27. Id. Justice Scalia stated that witnesses are those who bear testimony. In doing so, Scalia was not
directly quoting a Webster definition of the noun "witness," but referring to Webster's first definition of
"witness" as an intransitive verb: "[1t]o bear testimony." Id.
28. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search
"witness").
29. Id.
30. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (stating that the Confrontation Clause aimed to prevent "ex parte
20061
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Webster's broader definition, however, the person is a witness to the shooting even if
she had not made any testimonial statement. She became a witness not by the act of
testifying but instead by personally perceiving the event.
Since Crawford does not even mention this definition, the opinion, of course, does
not explain why it should not be the definition intended by the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Maryland v. Craig,31 at least at first glance, suggests a
reason. Justice Scalia there did recognize that "witness" could have a different
meaning from the one he ascribed to it in Crawford. He stated:
As applied in the Sixth Amendment's context of a prosecution, the noun
"witness"--in 1791 as today-could mean either (a) one "who knows or
sees any thing; one personally present" or (b) "one who gives testimony" or
who "testifies," i.e., "[i]njudicial proceedings, [one who] make[s] a solemn
declaration under oath, for the purpose of establishing or making proof of
some fact to a court." 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English
Language (1828) (emphasis added). 32
Justice Scalia, however, quickly concluded that the Confrontation Clause could not
have adopted the more expansive definition: "The former meaning (one 'who knows or
sees') would cover hearsay evidence, but is excluded in the Sixth Amendment by the
words following the noun: 'witnesses against him.' The phrase obviously refers to
those who give testimony against the defendant at trial."'33
This explanation, however, fails on several grounds. Justice Scalia's dissent in
Craig implies that the Framers adopted Webster's meaning, but in fact Justice Scalia
bastardized the dictionary's definition. Justice Scalia correctly indicated that Webster
defined a "witness" as one who testifies, but then Justice Scalia made it appear as if
Webster clarified that phrase by limiting testimony to solemn declarations under oath in
judicial proceedings. 34 This was, to put it charitably, misleading. Webster did state in
a definition of "testimony" that it is "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact."'35 Webster's definition, however, unlike
examinations," not casual remarks). The Court stated:
This focus also suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. An
off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion
under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause
targeted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations might sometimes be admissible under modem
hearsay rules, but the Framers would not have condoned them.... An accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual
remark to an acquaintance does not.
Id.
31. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). The Court found that under the facts presented it did not violate the
Confrontation Clause for a child witness in a child sexual abuse case to testify outside the accused's presence
by one-way closed circuit television. Craig, 497 U.S. at 851-52.
32. Id. at 864 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 864-65.
34. See id. at 864 (defining witness as "one who gives testimony" or who "testifies," i.e., "in judicial
proceedings, [one who] make[s] a solemn declaration under oath, for the purpose of establishing or making
proof of some fact to a court" (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language,
supra note 24 (emphasis added)).
35. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search
"testimony"). See also infra Part L.C for a complete discussion of Webster's definitions of "testimony."
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Justice Scalia's, contains no "i.e." or its equivalent. Webster's definition is not limited
to judicial proceedings. Instead, after giving this definition of "testimony," Webster
stated, "Such affirmation in judicial proceedings, may be verbal or written, but must be
under oath."'36  Webster did not equate testimony with declarations in court.
"Testimony" was a broad category covering declarations both in and out of court. The
lexicographer only indicated that a subset of such declarations, those made in judicial
proceedings, had to be under oath.
37
This elided, rearranged, and supplemented definition, however, allowed Justice
Scalia to reject Webster's broader definition of "witness" in his dissenting opinion in
Craig. "A person who knows or sees anything" is not the meaning in the clause,
according to Justice Scalia, because the witnesses have to be against the accused, and
the entire "phrase obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at
trial. '38 If so, this manifest meaning has the Confrontation Clause affecting no
statements from out-of-court declarants; the constitutional provision only requires
confrontation of those who testify at the trial. Justice Scalia, however, was not willing
to restrict the provision to that "obvious" result. He stated, "We have nonetheless
found implicit in the Confrontation Clause some limitation upon hearsay evidence,
since otherwise the government could subvert the confrontation right by putting on
witnesses who know nothing except what an absent declarant said. '39 Apparently if the
36. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search
"testimony). Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in Crawford and correctly
quoted this definition of "testimony" to illustrate his conclusion that the Framers primarily focused on
statements made under oath. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
[W]hile I agree that the Framers were mainly concerned about sworn affidavits and depositions, it
does not follow that they were similarly concerned about the Court's broader category of testimonial
statements. As far as I can tell, unswom testimonial statements were treated no differently at
common law than were nontestimonial statements, and it seems to me any classification of
statements as testimonial beyond that of sworn affidavits and depositions will be somewhat
arbitrary, merely a proxy for what the Framers might have intended had such evidence been
liberally admitted as substantive evidence like it is today.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 71 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Scalia responded to this
portion of the Chief Justice's opinion by stating:
We find it implausible that a provision which concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte
affidavit thought trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK.... Even if, as the Chief Justice
mistakenly asserts, there were no direct evidence of how the Sixth Amendment originally applied to
unswom testimony, there is no doubt what its application would have been.
Id. at 52 n.3 (majority opinion).
37. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search
"testimony").
38. Craig, 497 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 865. Daniel Shaviro, writing about Justice Scalia's dissent in Craig, stated:
It is difficult to imagine a more complete and unconvincing non sequitur. Concededly, the words
"against him" establish that the "witnesses" covered by the Sixth Amendment are only a subset of
all persons having knowledge about the defendant's case. On what ground, however, does Justice
Scalia conclude that the subset consists only of those persons appearing at the trial? Why cannot the
term "witnesses against him" refer to all persons having knowledge about the case and whose
statements reporting such knowledge the prosecution uses as evidence against the defendant?
Under that meaning, hearsay declarants would be included. Looking at the words "witnesses
against him" in isolation from a "plain meaning" perspective, that interpretation appears at least as
2006]
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Clause is confined to its supposedly straightforward sense, it might have no real
meaning, and so it cannot be fully accepted. The text, supposedly so clear, cannot be
restricted to its clear meaning, Justice Scalia concluded. Perhaps the textual analyst
who has arrived at this point should pause, reflect, and retrace his steps to see if he
really took the right path because he seems to have emerged out of the thicket into a
wonderland where the Framers could not have actually meant what they wrote.
Justice Scalia in Crawford, in fact, rejected the obvious meaning he found in
Craig.4" Crawford concluded that the clause was aimed at preventing the use of ex
parte depositions and affidavits, or in other words, it primarily prohibited the use of a
certain sort of evidence that had been generated outside of trial.4 If it is obvious that
"witnesses against him" means those who testify at trial, then the selected wording
obviously could not accomplish that goal, and of course the Framers would have been
foolish to use such inapposite words. In other words, only if "witnesses against him"
means something other than what Justice Scalia found so clear in Craig could the
confrontation right do what Justice Scalia said it was intended to do in Crawford,
which was to prohibit some out-of-court statements. Only if Justice Scalia was wrong
in Craig could he have been right in Crawford.42
The focus of Justice Scalia's analysis changed from Craig to Crawford. In Craig,
Justice Scalia explicated the phrase "witnesses against him," while in the later case,
Crawford, he concentrated on the words "witnesses," which does appear in the
confrontation guarantee, and "testimony," which does not.43 His conclusion in Craig
that "witnesses against him" obviously referred to those testifying at trial44 was
abandoned in Crawford in favor of the conclusion that "witnesses" means those who
give testimonial statements.45 The text, which in the previous analysis only referred to
people who testified at trial, now is said to include people who do not appear at trial.
46
It was that abandoned approach, however, that Justice Scalia had used to explain why
Webster's broader definition of "witness" should be disregarded.
47
plausible as the one that Justice Scalia so rapidly concludes is "obvious."
Daniel Shaviro, The Confrontation Clause Today in Light of its Common Law Background, 26 VAL. U. L. REv.
337,365 (1991).
40. Cf Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 845, 865-
66 (1995) (stating that Scalia's "textual analysis [in Craig], though scientific in tone, is nevertheless
unconvincing. Justice Scalia's point is that the Clause does not 'expressly' exclude hearsay evidence;... But
the term "witnesses," thus contextualized, could just as well refer to those hearsay declarants whose statements
are offered 'against the defendant' at trial").
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-52.
42. Cf Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REv. 537, 597 (2003) ("Justice
Scalia's approach [in Craig] depends on a rigid interpretation of the clause 'witnesses against him.' This
approach selectively chooses a definition of the term 'witness,' which is neither favored nor sensible.").
43. The Confrontation Clause states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
44. Craig, 497 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
46. Compare Craig, 497 U.S at 864-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining witnesses as "those who give
testimony against the defendant at trial"), with Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (defining witnesses as those who
give ex parte testimony prior to trial).
47. Craig, 497 U.S. at 865.
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While Crawford gave no explanation for rejecting the expansive meaning of
"witnesses," Justice Scalia's concern in Craig might seem to have merit. To have the
clause mean that an accused has the right to confront people who know or saw anything
against him is awkward phraseology, but Webster added to this definition that a
"witness" was "one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-witness. '48
Stating that an accused has a right to confront eyewitnesses makes sense. Certainly, it
follows common usages of language to label one who saw the fire a witness to it, and it
was in Webster's day as indicated by his dictionary. If a person states to a friend, "I
saw the defendant flee when the barn started blazing," clearly that person can be
labeled a witness to the fire even though he is not a "witness" under Crawford because
he has not made a testimonial statement.4
9
Of course, for the confrontation right to kick in, he must not only be a "witness,"
he must also be "against" the accused. Surely, if that person does not testify and his
assertion is not admitted into evidence, he is not a witness against the accused. Surely
he is a witness against the accused if he testifies for the prosecution during the criminal
trial. And surely if the prosecutor introduces his hearsay assertion without calling him,
this evidence is admitted against the accused. But is he then a witness against the
accused?
Crawford did not define the Confrontation Clause's "against," but Justice Scalia
did offer a definition of that word in Cruz v. New York.50 Writing for the Court, he
stated, "Ordinarily, a witness is considered to be a witness 'against' a defendant for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause only if his testimony is part of the body of
evidence that the jury may consider in assessing his guilt. '51 This construction,
however, assumes that a "witness" is one who gives testimony, but the broader
definition of "witness" could easily be accommodated in a comparable formulation. To
say that a witness is one who knows or sees something by personal presence is to say in
the context of a criminal prosecution that a witness is one who has personal knowledge
of a relevant event. Such a witness could be considered "against" the accused if her
personal knowledge is part of the body of evidence that the jury may consider in
assessing the accused's guilt.5
2
48. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search
"witness").
49. Cf Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of
Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 1323, 1351-52 (1991) ("Justice Scalia [in Craig] conceded, and then
brushed aside, the first dictionary definition for "witness"--which, I daresay, embraces the predominant
common usage of the term. He was forced to acknowledge, of course, that the hearsay declarant fits that
definition precisely.... Scalia's claims about the "obvious" and "literal" import of ["against him"] simply do
not hold water and plainly violate his own rule of careful attention to what the text literally says. The Sixth
Amendment does not say that the defendant shall enjoy "the right... to be confronted with the witnesses
testifying at trial against him," although that is what Scalia's argument suggested it says and would require it
to say. Why a "witness"-in the ordinary sense of one who witnesses the underlying events--cannot, by every
rule of common-sense interpretation known to the English language, be said to be a witness "against" the
defendant when his hearsay account of the underlying events is in fact used against the defendant at trial is
altogether beyond my ken.).
50. 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
51. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 190.
52. See State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 439 (1858) (interpreting a confrontation guarantee under a state
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The text of the Confrontation Clause could be read to support Crawford's
interpretation of "witnesses" as those who give testimony about a relevant event, but it
does not compel that result. The text could also mean "witnesses" are those with
personal experience or knowledge of a relevant event, and in either the broader or
narrower sense, such witnesses can plausibly be "against" the accused if the jury can
rely on the witnesses' knowledge to convict. Crawford's narrower definition is not
driven by the text but is an unexplained choice of one possibility.
C. Webster and "Testimony"
Just as Justice Scalia selected without explanation a narrow definition of
"witness" from Webster, he also selected a narrow definition of "testimony. '53
Webster's dictionary does define that word as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."'54 This, however, is not the
only definition. "Testimony," according to Webster also means, "Affirmation;
declaration." 55 In this broader definition, any declaration, not just a "solemn" one, is
"testimony," and "testimony" is not limited to those declarations made for the
particular purpose of proving a fact. Even if a "witness" is to be limited to someone
who gives testimony, under the broader definition of "testimony" all hearsay declarants
would be "witnesses."
Webster gave yet another relevant definition for "testimony": "Witness; evidence;
proof of some fact."'56  Even if "witness" is merely confined to "one who gives
testimony," a person giving proof of some fact is a "witness." Hearsay declarants fall
within this formulation. The in-court witness is offered to prove that an out-of-court
declaration was made, but the fact sought to be proved by hearsay is the truth of what
the out-of-court declarant stated.57 The hearsay declarant gives proof of some fact and,
therefore, is a person who bears testimony. And when his proof is part of the body of
evidence that could convict a criminal defendant, he is a witness against the accused.
constitution, concluding that the out-of-court declarant is "real witness" when court admits dying declaration
or former testimony). The court further stated:
The living witness is but a conduit pipe-a mere organ, through whom this evidence is conveyed to
the court and jury. So is the magistrate who takes the deposition, or the by-stander who is able to
repeat what has been testified to on a former trial by a witness in the presence of the accused.
Id. Crawford cited Houser, see infra note 174, but did not discuss this part of Houser. Crawford, 541 U.S. at
50.
53. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (defining testimony as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact").
54. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search
"testimony"). That definition continues, "Such affirmation in judicial proceedings, may be verbal or written,
but must be under oath. Testimony differs from evidence; testimony is the declaration of a witness, and
evidence is the effect of that declaration on the mind, or the degree of light which it affords." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (search "testimony"). Webster defined evidence: "That which elucidates and enables the mind to
see truth; proof arising from our own perceptions by the senses, or from the testimony of others, or from
inductions of reason." Id. (search "evidence").
57. See FED. R. EvID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted").
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Thus, while Justice Scalia's conclusion that a witness is one who gives a solemn
declaration to prove some fact is a plausible interpretation of what the Framers
intended, 58 a textual analysis based on Noah Webster's dictionary can just as plausibly
reach other conclusions. 59 A witness can be one who has perceived an event. A
witness can be someone giving proof of some fact or one who has made a declaration.
An honest textual analysis can lead to the conclusion that "witnesses" in the
Confrontation Clause includes all hearsay declarants as well as to a narrower definition.
D. "Testimonial Statements"
Harder, if not impossible, to derive from the text are any of the possible
definitions for testimonial statements that Crawford discussed. The Court stated:
Various formulations for this core class of "testimonial" statements exist: "ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, materials such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statement that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially," Brief for Petitioner 23;
"extrajudicial statements .. contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions," White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); "statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial," Brief
for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae
3. These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the
Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.60
The Court does not explain what that common nucleus is, but none of the three
definitions restricts "testimonial" to in-court testimony at the accused's trial. Indeed,
the first two formulations do not even cover in-court testimony. All three extend
"witnesses" to hearsay declarants, but only to a limited class of hearsay declarants. Not
surprisingly, Crawford did not explain how a textual analysis leads to any of these
definitions of testimonial statements, for it is impossible to derive any of these
possibilities from the clause's words. For example, surely no one could read the phrase
"witnesses against him" and divine that those words really mean "'extrajudicial
statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits ....,,61
58. But see Kirst, supra note 14, at 85 (noting that Scalia "cited Noah Webster's 1828 dictionary, not
exactly a contemporary source for the meaning of language used four decades earlier"). Webster, however,
started work on the dictionary in 1805. DAVID MICKLETHWAIT, NOAH WEBSTER AND THE AMERICAN
DICTIONARY 171 (2000).
59. Compare Stanley Fish's critique of the textualist position:
Nor does [a text] mean what the dictionary tells us about the words it contains, because what the
dictionary gives us is a record of the intentions previous speakers have had when using a word, a
record, that is, of possible and multiple meanings absent any way of specifying which is the right
(that is, intended) one; ....
Stanley Fish, There is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 644 (2005).
60. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
61. Id. (citation omitted). The State of Washington presented the definition of "testimonial" listed first
in Crawford, but previously the same definition had been offered by the United States as amicus curiae in
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Even if "witness" means one who bears testimony, since the text itself contains no
limitation on "testimony," all "testimony" from some definition of that word would be
incorporated into "witness," not just a subset of testimony singled out in each of the
proposals. If courts adopt any of these formulations as part of the Confrontation
Clause, it has to be in spite of the text, not because of it. And it should be realized that,
if the Framers truly intended to restrict the right of confrontation as suggested by any of
the possible definitions, they drafted poorly.
II. "WITNESSES" IN THE CONSTITUTION
Any interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has to go beyond its text. An
appropriate extratextual source to attempt to determine the Framers' intent, of course, is
the history that led up to the Clause's adoption.62 While Crawford v. Washington63
derived meaning from that history, the Court did not consider other constitutional
provisions that could illuminate the meaning of "witnesses" for confrontation. Since
the drafters of a text are normally assumed to have meant the same thing for the same
word throughout that text,64 seeing how the word "witness" is used in other parts of the
Constitution should help in understanding what "witnesses" means in the Confrontation
Clause. 65
The words "witness" or "witnesses" occur in three other places in the
Constitution: the Treason Clause of Article III;66 the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment;67 and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 6
The definition of "witness" as one who makes "testimonial" statements, that is,
statements that are akin to ex parte examinations or depositions, conflicts with all the
other constitutional meanings, casting doubt on Crawford's selected meaning for
"witnesses."
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992). In White, Thomas and Scalia said that this formulation might be
difficult to apply since "[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of legal
proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties." White, 502 U.S. at
364 (Thomas, J., concurring). See also id. (stating: "Few types of statements could be categorically
characterized as within or without the reach of a defendant's confrontation rights.").
62. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text for Crawford's reliance on the history of the
Confrontation Clause.
63. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
64. Montoya, supra note 40, at 866 n.142.
65. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 230 (1993) ("We
adhere to 'the normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act
are intended to have the same meaning."' (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990)). See also
MICHAEL SINCLAIR, A GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 137 (2000) ("The presumption is that the
legislature meant the same thing with each use [of the same word or group of words].").
66. The Treason Clause states: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No person shall be convicted of
Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court."
U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3, cl. 1.
67. The Self-Incrimination Clause states: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. The Compulsory Process Clause states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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A. "Witnesses" in the Treason Clause
"Witnesses" appears in the main body of the Constitution in the Treason Clause,
which states: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of Two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court."6 9 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this provision only once, in Cramer v. United States,7 0 but it did not consider the
meaning of "witnesses" in the provision. The text itself, however, indicates that that
term in the Treason Clause means something different from Crawford's version. If a
witness is one who gives testimony, then the provision could be reformulated to state
that testimony from two people who testify is required. This produces a redundancy.
If this were the meaning, the Clause could have been more succinctly phrased: no
person shall be convicted of treason without two witnesses to the same overt act.
Instead, by requiring testimony from two witnesses, the Clause indicates that there are
witnesses who do not give testimony.
The Treason Clause requires witnesses to an act.7" This has to mean that people
are required who have witnessed an act. People are required who have personal
knowledge of an act. People do not become witnesses under the Treason Clause when
or because they give testimony, as Crawford has it; instead, they are witnesses because
they saw or know something by personal presence, just as Webster was a witness to
ratification ceremonies.72 A person can only be convicted of treason if two such
witnesses testify to the treasonous overt act. 73 If they do not testify, they are still
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
70. 325 U.S. 1 (1945). The Court noted: "In the century and a half of our national existence not one
execution on a federal treason conviction has taken place. Never before has this Court had occasion to review
a conviction." Cramer, 325 U.S. at 24.
71. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. Cramer concluded that two witnesses have to testify to a treasonous
act, stating:
The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it show
sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid
and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses.
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 34-35. The Court reversed the treason conviction. Id. at 48. While there had been two
witnesses to meetings between Cramer and German nationals who had infiltrated for the purpose of sabotage
during World War II, those witnesses did not testify that anything treasonous happened in these meetings. Id.
at 37. The Court stated:
By direct testimony of two or more [FBI] agents it was established that Cramer met Thiel and
Kerling on the occasions and at the places charged and that they drank together and engaged long
and earnestly in conversation. This is the sum of the two overt acts as established by the testimony
of two witnesses. There is no two-witness proof of what they said nor in what language they
conversed. There is no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value to their
mission or indeed that he had any to give. No effort at secrecy is shown, for they met in public
places. Cramer furnished them no shelter, nothing that can be called sustenance or supplies, and
there is no evidence that he gave them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks.
Id.
72. See supra Part l.B for a discussion of the definition of "witness."
73. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the meaning of witness in the Treason Clause. See also
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 34-35 (noting that "[e]very act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
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witnesses to the act, but the accused cannot be convicted because their testimony has
not been presented. "Witness" and "testimony" in the Treason Clause are therefore
separate concepts.
Let's say a defendant is charged with treason for bombing an American
installation. Imagine that moments after the blast, two people whip out their phones,
calling a friend and a spouse, each frantically declaring that they just saw the defendant
set off the bomb. Would a treason conviction be valid based on the testimony of the
friend and spouse? The court could admit the statements of the two who saw the blast
as excited utterances, 74 and the introduction of this hearsay would not violate
Crawford's conception of confrontation rights because the hearsay declarants
apparently are not within that decision's definition of "witnesses."7 5 The prosecution
has produced two people-two witnesses-who have given in-court testimony about
the same overt act, but surely a treason conviction could not stand. The witnesses to
that overt act are not those reporting the hearsay, but are the hearsay declarants
themselves, and those declarants would have to testify. They are the "witnesses"
within the meaning of the Treason Clause. Indeed, they are the "witnesses" within
ordinary usage of that term. If you asked the prosecutors, What two witnesses to the
same overt act do you have? they would clearly discuss the hearsay declarants. They
are the crucial "witnesses," not because of testimonial statements they may have made,
but because of their personal knowledge. The most natural reading of "witnesses" here
is not Crawford's. A person is a "witness" for the Treason Clause because of what he
has personally observed, that is, because he is an eyewitness, and two eyewitnesses
must testify to the same overt act for a valid treason conviction.7 6
Of course, since the Framers drafted the Treason Clause several years before the
Sixth Amendment, its relevance for the Confrontation Clause might be questioned, but
the effect of the testimony-from-two-witnesses rule has an important consequence for
confrontation. The constitutional generation was especially concerned about treason.
Cramer noted that "the basic law of treason in this country was framed by men who...
were taught by experience and by history to fear abuse of the treason charge almost as
much as they feared treason itself."'77 Consequently, the Treason Clause intertwined
substantive and procedural limitations. 78 The requirement of testimony from two
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses").
74. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (defining "excited utterance" as "[a] statement relating to a startling event
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event of condition"
and, therefore, not excluded by the hearsay rule even if the declarant is available to testify).
75. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
76. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 692 (1996) (answering
his question of whether a hearsay declarant could be a witness within the Treason Clause: "I should hope not.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more patent (and, if permitted, potent) evasion of the words and the spirit of the
Treason Clause's requirement of two witnesses. And so, here at least, "witness" most clearly does not mean
any out-of-court declarant."). Amar's logic disregards the text of the Treason Clause, which does not just
require two witnesses but instead requires testimony from two witnesses to the same overt act. The hearsay
declarant, of course, may have been an eyewitness to the overt act and therefore is a witness within the
meaning of the Treason Clause, but if that declarant does not testify, the accused cannot be validly convicted
of treason because there has not been testimony from two witnesses to the same overt act.
77. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 21.
78. See id. at 29 (concluding that the constitutional requirement for treason includes more than just
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witnesses helped assure that the prosecution would have to have strong proof of the
treasonous action, but it also guaranteed that those who claimed an accused had
committed treason did so in court where the accused could confront them. 79 A treason
conviction cannot rest on hearsay, not because there must be two witnesses to the overt
act, but because two witnesses-people with personal knowledge-must testify.
Because of the testimony requirement, there can be no treason conviction unless the
accused has the opportunity to confront the crucial witnesses against him. Testimony is
not merely a part of the definition of "witnesses" in the Treason Clause; they are
distinct requirements. If "witness" has the same meaning throughout the Constitution,
the Treason Clause indicates that Crawford's definition of that term is wrong.
B. "Witness " in the Fifth Amendment
"Witness" appears in the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, which
states, "No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... ,80 The Supreme Court has seemingly adopted a Crawford-like meaning
for that use of "witness," by stating, "The word 'witness' in the constitutional text [of
the Fifth Amendment] limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating
communications to those that are 'testimonial' in character."
81
The concept of "testimonial" in the Fifth Amendment, however, is much different
from Crawford's. It encompasses not only statements akin to those in ex parte
depositions, but also communications that relate a factual assertion or disclose
information, as the Court made clear in Doe v. United States.82 Doe, pursuant to
subpoena, appeared before a grand jury and produced records of transactions with
offshore banks. 83 When asked about other records, he invoked his privilege against
self-incrimination. 84 The government then successfully sought to have the district
disloyal thoughts or speech, and the overt-act requirement furthered this substantive limitation). The overt-act
requirement "repeats in procedural terms the concept that thoughts and attitudes alone cannot make a treason."
Id.
79. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, JR., 30 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 666.
Wright and Graham wrote:
[Riequiring the prosecution to produce two witnesses does more than make proof difficult; it also
means that the defendant must be "confronted" by his accusers .... [Treason] cannot be proved
by... hearsay .... Hence, in this rather limited way, the Constitution did provide for confrontation
of witnesses despite the absence of a bill of rights.
Id. at 666.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
81. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000). The privilege against self-incrimination is not
violated by the compulsion of nontestimonial evidence. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966) (stating that "[t]he distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that the
privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a
suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it"). A person's constitutional
right is not violated by requiring him to don a blouse, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910), give
a blood sample, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760-61, or participate in a lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 221 (1967), for these acts are not testimonial.
82. 487 U.S. 201, 204 (1988).
83. Doe, 487 U.S. at 202.
84. Id. at 203.
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court order Doe to sign forms consenting to disclosure of records from foreign bank
accounts over which the government believed Doe had control. 85 When he refused
based on his Fifth Amendment privilege, the court held him in contempt.8 6
The Supreme Court stated that the controlling question "is whether the act of
executing the form is a 'testimonial communication."'' 87 The Court surveyed some of
its earlier self-incrimination cases and concluded, "[I]n order to be testimonial, an
accused's communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion
or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a 'witness' against
himself."88 The Court concluded that the consent form did not require Doe to relate a
factual assertion or disclose information and, therefore, did not compel the making of a
testimonial statement. 89 Responding to the claim that this holding altered the power of
the Government to force people to aid in their own prosecution, the Court responded,
"There are very few instances in which a verbal statement, either oral or written, will
not convey information or assert facts. The vast majority of verbal statements thus will
be testimonial and, to that extent at least, will fall within the privilege." 90  The
government does not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination if the
government has not compelled the making of a statement91 or if the statement does not
incriminate its maker,92 but if the statement conveys information or asserts any fact, it
is testimonial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and its maker is a witness. 93
85. Id. at 205.
86. Id. at 205-06.
87. Id. at 207. The Court stated that compulsion was obvious, and it would assume that there would be
incrimination. Doe, 487 U.S. at 207.
88. Id. at 210.
89. The Court concluded that "neither the form, nor its execution, communicates any factual assertion,
implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government." Id. at 215. The Court also found:
The consent directive itself is not "testimonial." It is carefully drafted not to make reference to a
specific account, but only to speak in the hypothetical. Thus, the form does not acknowledge that an
account in a foreign financial institution is in existence or that it is controlled by petitioner. Nor
does the form indicate whether documents or any other information relating to petitioner are present
at the foreign bank, assuming that such an account does exist.
id.
90. Id. at 213-14.
91. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 (1976) (holding that seizure of petitioner's records did
not violate his privilege against self-incrimination because "petitioner was not asked to say or to do anything.
The records seized contained statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed to writing."); see also Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976) (stating that "the privilege protects a person only against being
incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications").
92. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District of Nevada, 542 U.S 177, 189 (2004) ("Stating one's name may
qualify as an assertion of fact relating to identity. Production of identity documents might meet the definition
as well... [but] in this case disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.").
93. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596-97 (1990). The Court in Muniz stated:
Whatever else it may include,.., the definition of 'testimonial' evidence articulated in Doe [v.
United States] must encompass all responses to questions that, if asked of a sworn suspect during a
criminal trial, could place the suspect in the "cruel trilemma" [of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt] . . . . Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an
express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity, or
silence, and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial
component.
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The Fifth Amendment definition of "witness" does not just include those who have
given the equivalent of ex parte affidavits or depositions, but anyone who has made a
factual assertion.94 Under this definition, all hearsay declarants have made testimonial
statements and are witnesses. As with the Treason Clause, if "witness" has the same
meaning throughout the Constitution, then the Fifth Amendment's use of that word
indicates that Crawford's definition of "witness" is wrong.
C. "Witnesses" in the Compulsory Process Clause
Even if "witnesses" in the Treason Clause and "witness" in the Self-Incrimination
Clause can somehow be simply disregarded in interpreting confrontation, 95 a
compelling case exists for interpreting "witnesses" consistently with its other
appearance in the Sixth Amendment, in the Compulsory Process Clause. 96 The
Compulsory Process Clause provides: "The accused shall enjoy the right... to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" and follows the confrontation
guarantee in the Sixth Amendment. "Witnesses" appears in the Compulsory Process
Clause nine words after the use of that term in the Confrontation Clause, and the
drafters of the Sixth Amendment no doubt intended consistent uses for the word in both
places.97
Furthermore, compulsory process and confrontation should be interpreted
consistently with each other for they serve the same goals. They interrelate with the
Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and notice to provide an accused an adversarial
trial where the accused has a fair opportunity to defend himself.98 While Crawford
ignored confrontation's interrelationship with other rights, elsewhere the Supreme
Court has acknowledged it. In interpreting the Right to Counsel Clause for example,
the Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement of the rights necessary
to a full defense .... [T]hese rights are basic to our adversary system of
criminal justice .... The rights to notice, confrontation, and compulsory
process, when taken together, guarantee that a criminal charge may be
Id.
94. See Doe, 487 U.S. at 210 (stating that to act as witness against himself, the accused must provide a
testimonial communication that "relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] information").
95. But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, at 781-82 (noting that "we cannot understand the
meaning of 'confrontation' by looking at that clause alone; we must also look at the other provisions of the
Sixth Amendment and to the Bill of Rights as a whole").
96. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
97. See Montoya, supra note 40, at 866 n.142 (stating: "When a drafter uses the same term in another
part of the same document, we ordinarily presume that he or she meant it in the same sense. This maxim of
interpretation carries special weight here, since the clauses are close to one another in the same constitutional
amendment."); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Foreword: Notes for a Consistent and Meaningful Sixth
Amendment, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 713, 737 (1992) (arguing: "If compulsory process and
confrontation are read as part of one Sixth Amendment, it can hardly make sense for 'witnesses' to have one
meaning for confrontation and a different one for compulsory process."). Cf United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S.
688, 704 (1993) (stating that "it is embarrassing to assert that the single term 'same offence' ... has two
different meanings" for the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution prongs of the Fifth Amendment
Double Jeopardy Clause).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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answered in a manner now considered fundamental to the fair administration
of American justice-through the calling and interrogation of favorable
witnesses, the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and the orderly
introduction of evidence. In short, the Amendment constitutionalizes the
right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know it.99
The rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and compulsory process are specific
components of the fundamental guarantee that an accused can defend himself through
our adversary system. 10  The interrelationship of confrontation and compulsory
process is particularly close. An accused's right to defend himself would be
incomplete if he could only confront prosecution witnesses and not call his own. It
would be incomplete if he could call favorable witnesses but not cross-examine adverse
ones. Both rights are necessary if the accused is to have a fair opportunity to defend
himself.10 1 Neither can be understood apart from the other,10 2 for, as Peter Westen has
stated, confrontation and compulsory process "are conceptual twins. They both assist
the accused in presenting a defense by enabling him to produce and examine witnesses
on his behalf."1
0 3
This conceptual consanguinity, however, is cleaved by Crawford's definition of
"witness." Under compulsory process, the accused seeks to produce people not
because they have made testimonial statements, but because he hopes they will make
favorable testimonial statements at the criminal trials. He seeks to compel the presence
of those who are not "witnesses" within the meaning of Crawford, but those who might
become witnesses. If "witnesses" nine words apart means the same thing, an accused
should not have compulsory process for someone he has no right to confront. Surely,
99. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
100. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). The Court in Oliver stated:
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights
include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel.
Id. See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a criminal trial to
due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized
as essential to due process.").
101. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (explicating Sixth Amendment rights of
confrontation and compulsion). The Court in Washington stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain
terms the right to present a defense .... Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his
own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.
Id. See also Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1119
(1999) (stating: "Both the Supreme Court itself and academic commentators have remarked, in general, upon
the connection between the [Confrontation and Compulsory Process] Clause[s].").
102. Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HARv. L. REv. 567, 569 (1978) (arguing that "neither confrontation nor compulsory process can be
meaningfully understood without reference to the companion provision").
103. Peter Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1185, 1197 (1979).
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though, the accused has the right to have people produced who do not fit Crawford's
definition of "witness," at least based on what the Supreme Court has indicated.104
Consider co-conspirator statements. They apparently are not "testimonial" within
the meaning of Crawford, 105 and therefore, can be introduced against the accused
without prior cross-examination and without producing the declarant. In other words, a
co-conspirator declarant is not a "witness" within the meaning of the Confrontation
Clause. Even so, the Court in United States v. Inadi 10 6 held that co-conspirator
statements could be constitutionally admitted and stated that the accused could have
used his compulsory process rights to have the declarant produced."0 7 Inadi upheld the
admission of co-conspirator statements against the accused without a showing of the
declarants' unavailability.108 The Court, however, went on to state that if the defendant
had wanted to cross-examine the declarants, he could have produced them, explaining,
"The Compulsory Process Clause would have aided respondent in obtaining the
104. See infra notes 105-09 for a discussion of the accused's right to produce witnesses that do not fall
under Crawford's definition of witness.
105. In discussing hearsay exceptions at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Crawford stated:
"Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for example,
business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56. Crawford
concluded that Supreme Court confrontation cases have been largely consistent with Crawford's principles,
and indicated that Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), where the admission of co-conspirator
statements was held not to violate the Confrontation Clause, was correctly decided. Id. at 58. See Mosteller,
supra note 12, at 533 (noting that Crawford "considered co-conspirator statements outside the testimonial
category .... ). See also State v. Poll, 8 N.C. 442 (182 1) (finding co-conspirator statements inadmissible).
Indeed, in Poll, Justice Henderson stated:
The rule has never been carried further than this, that when a common design is proven, the act of
one in furtherance of that design is evidence against his associates; it is in some measure the act of
all; but the declarations of one of the parties can received only against himself.
Id. at 246. But see United States v. Burr (Burr 11), 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va 1807) (No. 14694). In Burr, the
prosecution sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by the absent witness, Herman Blennerhassett, to
one Neale, as declarations of a co-conspirator. Id. at 193. The prosecution argued that there was "a conspiracy
between these two [Blennerhassett and Burr] and others; and that the declarations of one conspirator were
evidence against the others; or, 2d, that they were accomplices." Id. at 193 n.5. Chief Justice John Marshall,
who presided over the trial of Aaron Burr, relied on the right of confrontation and ruled the evidence
inadmissible:
The rule of evidence which rejects mere hearsay testimony, which excludes from trials of a criminal
or civil nature the declarations of any other individual than of him against whom the proceedings are
instituted, has been generally deemed all essential to the correct administration of justice. I know
not why a declaration in court should be unavailing, unless made upon oath, if a declaration out of
court was to criminate others than him who made it; nor why a man should have a constitutional
claim to be confronted with the witnesses against him, if mere verbal declarations, made in his
absence, may be evidence against him. I know of no principle in the preservation of which all are
more concerned. I know none, by undermining which, life, liberty and property, might be more
endangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be watchful of every inroad on a principle so
truly important.
Id. Marshall went on to indicate that co-conspirator statements could be admitted to prove the crime of
conspiracy, but they could not be introduced to prove other criminal conduct of an accused. Id. at 193-95.
106. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).




testimony of any of these declarants."' 10 9 But after Crawford it must be asked, if the
accused has no right to confront a declarant because he is not a "witness" within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, why does he have a constitutional right to
produce him as a "witness?" Either these conceptually linked clauses employ different
definitions of the same term, or Crawford's definition is wrong, or compulsory process
rights are more severely limited than the Court and commentators have assumed.
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal1 "1 and its discussion of Roviaro v. United States, I I I
however, indicate that compulsory process contains a broad definition of "witnesses."
Albert Roviaro was convicted of illegally transporting narcotics after federal
agents testified that they observed him deliver drugs to a government informer." 2 The
government did not call the informer to testify and, relying on the "informer's
privilege,"" 3 refused to reveal his identity to the defense. The Court, however, held
that "[w]here the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his
communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.""' 4 The Court concluded
that the government should have disclosed the informer's identity and reversed."l5
In Valenzuela-Bernal, Ricardo Valenzuela-Bemal was convicted of transporting
an illegal immigrant into the United States. 1 6 The government quickly deported two
of the three apprehended people he drove over the border, but held the third, Enrique
Romero-Morales, to establish a nonhearsay basis for the prosecution."17 The accused
109. Id. at 397. The Court noted that Federal Rule of Evidence 806 would have permitted the defendant
to cross-examine the declarants if he had called them as witnesses. Id. at 398. See also Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 80 (1970) (holding that the admission of hearsay without production of the declarant did not violate
the Confrontation Clause). Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, stated: "Of course Evans had the right to
subpoena witnesses, including [the hearsay declarant] ...." Id. at 88 n.19; Amar, supra note 76, at 693-94
(contending that "witnesses" within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause means in-court witnesses and
"videotapes, transcripts, depositions, and affidavits when prepared for court use and introduced as testimony,"
but B is not a witness when best-friend A recounts in court what B said out-of-court). Amar explains:
[T]he very existence of the Compulsory Process Clause... powerfully undercuts any possible
fairness concern about our straightforward reading of 'witness' in the Confrontation Clause. If
witness A testifies about what out-of-court friend B said, and the defendant wants to challenge B's
memory or truthfulness directly, face to face, the defendant can always use his own compulsory
process right to subpoena B and interrogate him on the stand, for all to see.
Amar, supra note 76, at 696. Amar does not explain why if B is not a witness for confrontation purposes, the
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to produce this nonwitness.
110. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
Ill. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
112. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 55-56.
113. Id.at55. TheCourtstated:
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law
enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of the citizens to communicate their
knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by preserving their
anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.
Id. at 59.
114. Id. at 60-61.
115. Id. at 65.
116. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 860.
117. Id. at 861.
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claimed that the deportation of the two illegal immigrants denied the accused the
chance to interview and call them as witnesses and, therefore, deprived him of his
compulsory process rights.1 8 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist,
affirmed the conviction, concluding that under the presented circumstances,"19 to
establish a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause, the accused "must at least
make some plausible showing of how [the deported persons'] testimony would have
been both material and favorable to his defense."' 120 In reaching this result, Valenzuela-
Bernal's analysis accepted a much broader meaning for "witnesses" than the one
selected by Crawford.
Justice Rehnquist stated that Roviaro was the "closest case in point"'12 1 and quoted
from it:
The Roviaro Court held that the informer's identity had to be disclosed, but
only after it concluded that the informer's testimony would be highly
relevant: "This is a case where the Government's informer was the sole
participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged. The informer
was the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of
government witnesses. Moreover, a government witness testified that [the
informer] denied knowing petitioner or ever having seen him before. We
conclude that, under these circumstances, the trial court committed
prejudicial error in permitting the Government to withhold the identity of its




119. Id. at 859-60. Valenzuela-Bernal stressed that Congress had authorized prompt deportation in
instances like the one before the Court and that control of immigration is a crucial component of sovereignty
granted to the government's political branches:
The power to regulate immigration-an attribute of sovereignty essential to the preservation of any
nation-has been entrusted by the Constitution to the political branches of the Federal Government[,
and]... Congress has determined that prompt deportation, such as occurred in this case, constitutes
the most effective method for curbing the enormous flow of illegal aliens across our southern
border.
Id. at 864. The Court limited its holding: "In adopting this standard, we express no opinion on the showing
which a criminal defendant must make in order to obtain compulsory process for securing the attendance at his
criminal trial of witnesses within the United States." Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873 n.9. The Court also
concluded:
No onus, in the sense of 'hiding out' or 'concealing' witnesses, attached to the Government by
reason of its discharge of the obligations imposed upon it by Congress; its exercise of these
manifold responsibilities is not to be judged by the standards which might be appropriate if the
Government's only responsibility were to prosecute criminal offenses.
Id. at 866.
120. Id. at 867. The Court concluded that the accused had failed to meet this burden and affirmed. Id. at
871. The Court indicated that under the circumstances this burden was not unfair and stated:
[lI]t should be remembered that respondent was present throughout the commission of this crime.
No one knows better than he what the deported witnesses actually said to him, or in his presence,
that might bear upon whether he knew that Romero-Morales was an illegal alien who had entered
the country within the past three years.
Id. (emphasis added).
121. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 870.
122. Id. at 870-71 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64-65).
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The Court in Valenzuela-Bernal relied on Roviaro for the proposition that an
accused did not have an absolute right under compulsory process to have an informer's
identity disclosed, and that the burden it imposed on the accused was not unfair.
123
Justice Rehnquist stated:
Roviaro supports the conclusion that while a defendant who has not had an
opportunity to interview a witness may face a difficult task in making a
showing of materiality, the task is not an impossible one. In such
circumstances it is of course not possible to make any avowal of how a
witness may testify. But the events to which a witness might testify, and the
relevance of those events to the crime charged, may well demonstrate either
the presence or absence of the required materiality.
124
In Valenzuela-Bernal and Roviaro, the Court did not use "witness" as Crawford
had. Justice Rehnquist wrote about "events to which a witness might testify.'
1 25
Roviaro referred to the informer as "the only witness in a position to amplify or
contradict the testimony of government witnesses." 126 "Witness" in these uses does not
make sense as one who gives testimony but only as one who has personally seen an
event, as one who has personal knowledge of it.
Compulsory process, however, extends beyond even those broad definitions of
"witnesses" to a guarantee that the accused has the right to produce and present
relevant evidence.127 This expansive reading of compulsory process goes at least as far
back as Aaron Burr's treason trial in 1807, where Chief Justice Marshall presided. 28
Burr's main accuser was General James Wilkinson. President Thomas Jefferson had
publicly referred to letters and documents Wilkinson had sent to him, and Burr sought
these items to impeach Wilkinson's expected trial testimony. 129 Referring to the
123. Valenzuela-Bernal noted that Roviaro was not based on constitutional claims, but concluded that
Roviaro "would not have been decided differently if those claims had actually been called to the Court's
attention." Id. at 870. This phrasing is confusing. Roviaro reversed the conviction, and if the defendant had
raised constitutional claims surely his conviction would not then have been affirmed. Presumably Valenzuela-
Bernal was indicating that if only constitutional claims had been made in Roviaro, the Compulsory Process
Clause would have compelled the result reached. Roviaro, after all, was seeking the identity of an informant
not merely as an abstract exercise, but to exercise his compulsory process rights to call the informant as a
witness at his trial. Without knowledge of that identity, he simply could not subpoena that witness. Certainly
Valenzuela-Bernal, a compulsory process case, treated the earlier case as a compulsory process precedent by
stating that Roviaro was the closest case in point and relying on it.
124. Id. at 871.
125. Id.
126. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64.
127. The Supreme Court has upheld the trial court denials of process for defense witnesses when the
application came in the midst of trial and the witnesses were of little importance. See Crumpton v. United
States, 138 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1891) (finding the trial court did not error in refusing defendant's application to
subpoena witnesses as such a decision was a matter of discretion and unreviewable); see also Issacs v. United
States, 159 U.S. 487, 489 (1895) (holding that trial court did not abuse discretion to refuse continuance to
defendant to obtain witnesses when diligence to obtain the witnesses was not shown).
128. See Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 871 n.8 (noting that Chief Justice Marshall found it
unreasonable to require that Burr explain the relevancy of a letter where he did not know the contents).
129. See Milton Hirsch, "The Voice of Adjuration ": The Sixth Amendment Right to Compulsory Process
Fifty Years after United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 81, 86-88 (2002) (describing
background of this dispute).
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Compulsory Process Clause,' 30 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the government's
contention "that a general subpoena might issue to the president; but not a subpoena
duces tecum"'13 1 and granted the subpoena. 132  Burr made clear that an accused's
compulsory process right extends to documentary evidence in the possession of a
person.1
33
More recently, the Court has reaffirmed that the accused's right extends to
"evidence." In United States v. Nixon,134 the Court upheld a prosecutor's subpoena
duces tecum to obtain tape recordings and documents from President Nixon. 35 In
reaching that result, the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, stressed the
importance of compulsory process for the production of evidence.136 Nixon stated:
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which
the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and
comprehensive.... To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the
function of the courts that compulsory process be available for the
production of evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial ... has
constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon
every defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.". . . It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate
those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant and
admissible evidence be produced.' 37
As Nixon makes clear, our adversarial system depends on the ability of the
accused to produce and present all relevant, admissible evidence, and the Compulsory
Process Clause grants him that right. The Clause is not limited to the notion of
"witnesses" that Crawford found in the Sixth Amendment, but includes those who have
evidence or proof.
130. United States v. Burr (Burr 1), 25 F. Cas. 30, 33 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
131. Id. at 34.
132. Id. at 38. By the time of subsequent proceedings a few months later, the government had conceded
the point. Marshall noted: "That the president of the United States may be subpoenaed, and examined as a
witness, and required to produce any paper in his possession, is not controverted." Burr 11, 25 F. Cas. at 191.
See also United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 626, 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (concluding that an accused could
subpoena members of Congress).
133. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55 (1987). In Ritchie, the Court said:
This Court has had little occasion to discuss the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause. The
first and most celebrated analysis came from a Virginia federal court in 1807, during the treason and
misdemeanor trials of Aaron Burr. Chief Justice Marshall, who presided as trial judge, ruled that
Burr's compulsory process rights entitled him to serve a subpoena on President Jefferson, requesting
the production of allegedly incriminating evidence.
Id.
134. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
135. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 702.
136. Id. at 709-12.
137. Id. at 709-11.
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D. Interpreting "Witnesses" Consistently Throughout the Constitution
Crawford simply ignored that the Constitution employs much broader definitions
for "witness" in the treason, self-incrimination, and compulsory process provisions than
the definition it chose. 138 Interestingly, however, Justices Scalia and Thomas have
suggested elsewhere that the meaning of "witness" in the Compulsory Process Clause
should at least inform the meaning for self-incrimination. In United States v.
Hubbell,139 a Court decision interpreting the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause, Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence joined by Justice Scalia. 140 Justice
Thomas concluded that the majority had correctly applied existing case law but
suggested that Fifth Amendment doctrine may be too narrowly cast.' 4' Justice Thomas
said that Court precedent "essentially defines 'witness' as a person who provides
testimony," while to the Framers "'witness' meant a person who gives or furnishes
evidence, a broader meaning than that which our case law currently ascribes to the
term."' 142 This broader meaning, Justice Thomas indicated, does not require the making
of a testimonial statement at all since "a person who responds to a subpoena duces
tecum would be just as much a 'witness' as a person who responds to a subpoena ad
testificandum."143
Thomas turned to dictionaries. He wrote, "Dictionaries published around the time
of the founding included definitions of the term 'witness' as a person who gives or
furnishes evidence. Legal dictionaries of that period defined 'witness' as someone who
'gives evidence in a cause.""'  Justice Thomas also turned to Webster, but not to the
definitions relied on in Crawford.145 Without mentioning the narrow definition given
by Webster, Justice Thomas concluded, "The term 'witness' apparently continued to
have this meaning at least until the first edition of Noah Webster's dictionary, which
defined it as 'that which furnishes evidence or proof.""' 14 6 And then to emphasize his
point that a witness is not simply one who gives testimony, Justice Thomas, citing
English cases, noted, "Further, it appears that the phrases 'gives evidence' and
'furnishes evidence' were not simply descriptions of the act of providing testimony."'
1 47
Besides giving this textual explication, however, Justice Thomas's concurring
opinion took an analytic step not found in Crawford; he referred to "witnesses" in the
138. See Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 348 (2005) (noting that intra-textual
consideration is a critical aspect of the textualist approach, and stating: "No 'textualist' favors isolating
statutory language from its surrounding context ... .
139. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
140. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 49-50.
143. Id. at 50.
144. Id. at 50 (citing 2 G. JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1762); 2 T. CUNNINGHAM, NEW
AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY 612 (2d ed. 1771); T. POTrs, A COMPENDIOUS LAW DICTIONARY 612
(1803); 6 G. JACOB, THE LAW-DICTIONARY 450 (T. Tomlins I st American ed. 1811)).
145. See supra notes 23-52 and accompanying text for discussion of Webster's definition in Crawford.
146. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 50 (Thomas, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 51 n.2.
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Compulsory Process Clause. He noted that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Burr
granted the accused the right to subpoena papers 48 and continued:
Although none of our opinions has focused upon the precise language or
history of the Compulsory Process Clause, a narrow definition of the term
"witness" as a person who testifies seems incompatible with Burr's holding.
And if the term "witnesses" in the Compulsory Process Clause has an
encompassing meaning, this provides reason to believe that the term
"witness" in the Self-Incrimination Clause has the same broad meaning. Yet
this Court's recent Fifth Amendment act-of-production cases implicitly rest
upon an assumption that this term has different meanings in adjoining
provisions of the Bill of Rights.1
49
But, of course, the same can be said even more strongly about Crawford, for it
rests on the assumption that "witnesses" has different meanings in adjoining clauses of
the same amendment, clauses that are conceptually linked.
III. "WITNESSES" IN THE STATE CONFRONTATION AND COMPULSORY PROCESS
PROVISIONS BEFORE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
One possible reason for assigning different meanings to the same term in the
Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses, in spite of their proximity and
common goal, is that the initial state guarantees of compulsory process granted broader
rights than the language of the Sixth Amendment reflects. Thus, Taylor v. Illinois,150 in
rejecting that the Compulsory Process Clause was limited to granting subpoena powers,
stated, "We have.., consistently given the Clause the broader reading reflected in
contemporaneous state constitutional provisions."' 5' The Court reflected that though
"[p]articulars varied from state to state . . . the provisions reflected a common
principle."1 52 Professor Janet Hoeffel has summarized these provisions:
The most popular language gave the defendant the right "to call for evidence
in his favor." Other states endorsed similar language giving the defendant
the right "to examine evidence on oath in his favor;" the right "to produce all
proofs, that may be favorable to him;" the right "to have process for his
witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath;" or the
right "to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony." Four
states also separately provided for some version of the right of a defendant
"to be heard (or 'fully heard in his defence') by himself and his council."
Only one state, New Jersey, opted for language indicating that the
148. Id. at 55. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text explaining how Justice Marshall rejected
the government's contention that a subpoena duces tecum cannot be issued to the President. Justice Thomas
also noted, "This Court has subsequently expressed agreement with this view of the Sixth Amendment." Id.
(citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711).
149. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
151. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 407-08.
152. Id. at 408 n.13 (citing Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 94-95
(1974) [hereinafter, Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause]).
2006]
TEMPLE LA WREVIEW
defendant's right was to be grounded in a notion of parity with the
prosecution.1
53
The Sixth Amendment language is narrower than these state provisions, but it is
doubtful that the Compulsory Process Clause was meant to be more restrictive. James
Madison, the drafter of the Confrontation Clause, was trying to build support for the
Constitution. Peter Westen has noted, "Although it can be argued that he intended to
confine the defendant to the right to compel his witnesses to attend trial, this narrow
construction is inconsistent with Madison's goal of achieving consensus."' 54 Though
the proposed Confrontation Clause garnered almost no debate, and what Madison and
the other Framers and ratifiers intended for it cannot really be known, Professor
Hoeffel's comments seem as plausible as any interpretation:
In the absence of any sort of record as to the reasoning for the language of
the Compulsory Process Clause, some principled speculation must suffice.
Madison was from Virginia, whose state provision gave the accused the right
to "call for evidence in his favour," much broader language than the Clause
ultimately adopted. Indeed, the majority of states' provisions also followed
this language and did not focus on the right to compel witnesses. Therefore,
one interpretation is that, because no state objected to the language of the
Clause, the language was intended and understood to encompass each state's
concern: the right to call for evidence, the right to compel witnesses, and the
right to parity with the government. Madison may have included the
compulsion language to make it perfectly clear that part of calling witnesses
in one's favor includes, by necessity, the right to have them compelled,
especially since that was a right that was overlooked in common law
England. 55
Thus, the state background to the Compulsory Process Clause supports the
conclusion that "witnesses" for compulsory process purposes does not just mean one
who gives testimony, but also "proof' or "evidence." Justice Thomas, concurring in
Hubbell, pointed out this likelihood. He noted that James Madison, in drafting the
Self-Incrimination Clause, "substituted the phrase 'to be a witness' for the proposed
language 'to give evidence' and 'to furnish evidence.' But it seems likely that
153. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 Wis.
L. REv. 1275, 1284-85 (2002) (citations omitted).
154. Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, supra note 152, at 99.
155. Hoeffel, supra note 153, at 1286-87 (citations omitted). See also Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, supra note 152, at 97-98 (arguing that "Madison's unique phrasing [for the Compulsory Process
Clause] suggests that he wished to fashion a neutral version that would satisfy the various states without
adopting the language of any existing statute or recommendation"). Cf Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 584-85 (1892) (describing the proper interpretive approach to the Self Incrimination Clause, in light of its
aims). The Court in Counselman stated:
[T]he manifest purpose of the [Self-Incrimination Clause], both of the States and of the United
States, is to prohibit the compelling of testimony of a self-incriminating kind from a party or a
witness, the liberal construction which must be placed upon constitutional provisions for the
protection of personal rights would seem to require that the constitutional guaranties, however
differently worded, should have as far as possible the same interpretation.
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Madison's phrasing was synonymous with that of the proposals. The definitions of the
word 'witness' . . . support this view." 156
Similar reasoning, however, can be applied to the Confrontation Clause. Every
state that adopted a declaration or bill of rights prior to the Constitution included a
confrontation clause, but the wording varied. While Maryland, followed by
Pennsylvania and Vermont, adopted the language that later appeared in the Sixth
Amendment, others granted an accused the right to be confronted with "accusers and
witnesses."' 57  New York, in ratifying the Constitution, passed a resolution that it
would withdraw from the union if a bill of rights was not adopted, and suggested an
amendment that said "that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ought.., to be
confronted with his accusers and the witnesses against him."' 158 Madison's original
draft of what was to become the Sixth Amendment used this New York language. 15 9
The House of Representatives referred Madison's proposal as well as those from other
states to a committee, which included Madison, consisting of one member from each
state. 160 This committee proposed the language that would become the Confrontation
Clause. 161 What "accusers" then meant in the state provisions and proposals, or why
the drafters dropped the word, cannot now be known. 162 Since, however, Madison and
the other Framers were "proposing amendments that had the broadest popular
appeal,"' 163 it is reasonable to conclude "that in dropping the phrase about 'his accusers'
and limiting the witnesses to be confronted to those 'against him,' the committee
thought it was capturing what was intended by 'accuser' and 'witnesses' rather than
limiting the scope of the right of confrontation."' 64
If "witness" in the Compulsory Process Clause encompasses "proof' or
"evidence," then "witness" in the Confrontation Clause should encompass "accuser."
156. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring).
157. See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, § 6346, at 580-611 (providing a history of the adoption
of these state provisions).
158. Id. at 755.
159. Id. at 760-61.
160. Jd. at 764.
161. Id.
162. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, § 6347, at 737 ("[l~t would be helpful to know what the word
['accusers'] means; however, the word is seldom used in the ratification debate or elsewhere.").
163. Id. at 767.
164. Id. at 764. However, in Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58 (Tenn. 1821), the court concluded that the
state's confrontation guarantee did not prohibit the introduction at trial of a deposition taken under oath in the
presence of the accused where the declarant had died. Id. at 60. The court referred to a similar ruling from
North Carolina and stated:
Our constitution is substantially the same, on the point on which this objection is founded, with the
constitution of North Carolina. The expression in our constitution... is, "the accused has a right to
meet the witnesses face to face." In the constitution of North Carolina, it is... "every man hath a
right to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony." The expression in both means
the same thing, and any implications that might be raised on the diction in the one case, with the
same and equal propriety might be raised in the other.
Id. 59-60 (discussing State v. Webb, I Haywood 104 (N.C. 1794)). See also State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 437
(Mo. 1858) ("The provision in our constitution now under consideration is also manifestly a copy,
substantially, of the Virginia bill of rights, for it is not to be supposed that the substitution of the words 'face to
face' for the word 'confronted' was designed to make any change in the meaning.").
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As with "witness" itself, Webster's 1828 Dictionary offers a broad and narrow meaning
for "accuser." Webster's definition: "One who accuses or blames; an officer who
prefers an accusation against another for some offense, in the name of the government,
before a tribunal that has cognizance of the offense."' 165 Thus, an accuser can be a
formal official or anyone who blames. It can be the one who formally brings a murder
charge or one who simply states that the defendant killed. Indeed, one of Webster's
synonyms for "accuser" gives an even broader meaning. He defined "denunciator" as:
"An accuser; one who informs against another.- 166 As with "witness," textual analysis
alone does not compel a particular meaning for "accuser" in the confrontation context.
A choice among possible meanings has to be made, and the text itself does not state
which meaning to choose. This background certainly does not indicate that a narrow
reading of "witnesses" is required. Instead, the history supports the contention that the
Framers of the Confrontation Clause were broadly protecting an important right that
encompassed all the concepts of confrontation that were emerging in the states.
IV. CRAWFORD'S DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION OF A MOST NATURAL READING OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Crawford endorses a cramped reading of the confrontation right compared to the
companion right of compulsory process, not because of text or history, but because of
Crawford's interpretive assumption that the Confrontation Clause "is most naturally
read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding."' 167 This assumption is dubious.
Nothing the Framers of the Sixth Amendment said supports Crawford's
interpretive assumption. The right of confrontation received little mention and no
comment at all on how it should be interpreted. Justice Thomas, in a concurring
opinion in which Justice Scalia joined, was correct when he stated, "There is virtually
no evidence of what the drafters of the Confrontation Clause intended it to mean.' 68
Crawford's assumption is not supported by other Sixth Amendment provisions,
for that amendment, as a whole, did not constitutionalize common law rights. 69 Most
165. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, An American Dictionary of the English Language, supra note 24 (search
"accuser").
166. Id. (search "denunciator").
167. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). But see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 422
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that he agreed with the majority's conclusion that the compulsory
process right granted the accused the right to present evidence to a jury; however, he differed with the Court's
statement that the plain language of that Clause supported the argument that the provision only granted a
subpoena right). Justice Brennan continued, "This plain language supports the State's argument only if one
assumes that the most natural reading of constitutional language is the least meaningful. For the right to
subpoena defense witnesses would be a hollow protection indeed if the government could simply refuse to
allow subpoenaed defense witnesses to testify." Id. at 422 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). See also California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded
parchment."); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative History, 27
RUTGERS L.J. 77, 77 (1995) [hereinafter Jonakait, Origins] ("The origins of the Confrontation Clause are
murky. Early American documents almost never mention the right, and the traditional sources for divining the
Framers' intent yield almost no information about the Clause.").
169. See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
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notable is the right to counsel. English common law actually prohibited defense
counsel in almost all felony prosecutions, but the Sixth Amendment guarantees an
accused the right to counsel.' 70 This portion of the Sixth Amendment was an explicit
rejection of existing English common law. Similarly, the common law did not have a
right of notice in most felony cases; the Sixth Amendment grants it. 17 1  English
common law also denied the accused compulsory process; the Sixth Amendment grants
it.' 72 The Sixth Amendment, as a whole, did not simply adopt the common law, but in
significant respects rejected it. 173 When viewing the Confrontation Clause in its
context, there is little reason simply to assume that the right to confrontation
constitutionalized the common law.
Not surprisingly, Crawford cited nothing contemporaneous with the adoption of
the Bill of Rights to justify its position about the most natural reading of the
Confrontation Clause. Instead its assertion was followed merely by references to the
1858 Missouri case, State v. Houser,174 and to the 1895 Supreme Court case, Mattox v.
United States.17 5 Since this was the only support given for that crucial assumption,
those two cases warrant a closer examination.
A. State v. Houser
At issue in Houser was Mary Henson's deposition from a preliminary
examination before a committing magistrate.176 Henson had disappeared by the time of
trial.' 77 The prosecution introduced her deposition into the trial, with the accused
claiming that this evidence violated his confrontation rights under the Missouri
Constitution.1
78
Houser discussed the development of the constitutional right to confrontation,
starting with Virginia's declaration of rights in June, 1776, and concluded that the early
confrontation provisions, from which Missouri's was derived, were incorporating the
common law.179 Houser reasoned:
[I]t would hardly be expected that in the midst of a revolution.., attempts
would be made in a constitution or bill of rights to introduce new codes of
procedure or new principles of evidence to govern the progress of ordinary
trials in civil or criminal cases. Our forefathers were satisfied with the
common law, so far as its great leading features were concerned; and they
considered themselves as securing every thing that was important and
valuable in relation to mere municipal rights of persons and property when
170. Jonakait, Origins, supra note 168, at 82.
171. Id. at 109. The Right of Notice Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
172. Id.
173. See Jonakait, Origins, supra note 168, at 108-22, for a more complete discussion of the Sixth
Amendment's rejection of common law.
174. 26 Mo. 431 (Mo. 1858).
175. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
176. Houser, 26 Mo. at 433.
177. Id. at 431.
178. Id. at 432.
179. Id. at 437.
2006]
TEMPLE LA W REVIEW
they solemnly and repeatedly adopted it and declared it to be their birth-
right. 1
80
Houser provided no insight into what the Framers intended for the right of
confrontation other than this logic, and such logic bears scrutiny. The Constitution was
not adopted in the midst of the Revolution but nearly a generation later and after much
had been learned and experienced about governments and rights. Independence had
been secured, and the Bill of Rights was not directly concerned with British
depredations but with limiting new federal powers. Houser did not explain why
confrontation just constitutionalized English common law when other Sixth
Amendment rights rejected the common law, and the Missouri court's mere assertion
that it did should hardly be considered weighty authority.' 8'
Houser further explained that testimony at preliminary examinations could be
admitted consistently with the right of confrontation, noting that "no case is to be found
in England in which the deposition of a witness, taken in the presence of the accused,
has been excluded where the witness has died since the examination."'182 The court's
statements about the right of confrontation, however, were dicta, for the court reversed
the conviction, holding that the deposition evidence should not have been admitted
because the declarant was not shown to be dead.' 83 The Missouri court stated, "[I]n
England no authority is to be found, so far as this examination has discovered, where,
in a criminal case, a deposition ... was admitted merely because the witness was
beyond seas or out of the reach of process of the court .... In this country the decisions
have been the same way."'18
4
Thus, Houser concluded that the ight to confrontation constitutionalized English
common law, that testimony from a preliminary hearing could be admitted without
violating confrontation rights, and that the common law only allowed such prior
testimonial statements if the declarant were dead.185 Of course, if Houser is to be taken
180. Id. at 435.
181. Houser concluded that Virginia's confrontation protection, from which Missouri fashioned its own
provision, incorporated the common law of 1776. Houser, 26 Mo. at 435. Houser further stated:
This common law they did not understand as the common law under the Plantagenets or Tudors or
Stuarts, but as it was understood at that day, both in England and this country, when the revolution
of 1688 and the subsequent parliamentary and judicial constructions had restored it to its primitive
purity, and abolished its occasional abuses in bad times and under corrupt administrations.
Id. Crawford, however, relied on English cases from as late as 1791. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46
("Nevertheless, by 1791 (the year the Sixth Amendment was ratified), courts were applying the cross-
examination rule even to examinations by justices of the peace in felony cases.") Inter alia, Crawford relied
on King v. Dingier, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 383-384 (P.C.), which barred the reading of testimony from a
prior transcript because the defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine. But see Davies, supra
note 14, at 153 (concluding that the 1787, 1789, and 1791 English cases cited by Crawford "were published
too late to have informed the Framers' thinking").
182. Houser, 26 Mo. at 435-36. Houser also concluded "none is to be found in this country." Id. at 436.
183. Id. at 440-41.
184. Id. at 439-40.
185. See, e.g., People v. Newman, 5 Hill 295, 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (holding that it was error to
admit former testimony of declarant who had left the state). The court stated, "It seems to be settled in this
court, that nothing short of the witness' death can be received to let in his testimony given on a former trial."
Id. at 296; see also State v. Thomas, 64 N.C. 74, 74 (1870). In this perjury trial to show that the accused
received certain cotton, books of a railroad company were admitted in evidence. Id. The notations were
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seriously in its conclusion that the confrontation right constitutionalized eighteenth
century English evidentiary practices, then confrontation works a major change in
modem conceptions of admissible hearsay since only the death of the declarant, and not
other grounds of unavailability permitted under modem evidence law, would permit the
introduction of prior testimonial statements against the accused.'
86
B. Mattox v. United States
Crawford referred to the portion of Mattox that asserted, "The primary object of
[the Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as
were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness . 1...",87 The Mattox Court
also stated:
We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed
at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new guaranties of the
rights of the citizen, but as securing to every individual such as he already
possessed as a British subject-such as his ancestors had inherited and
defended since the days of Magna Charta.188
The Court continued that the general rule had exceptions and "[s]uch exceptions were
obviously intended to be respected. A technical adherence to the letter of a
constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just
protection of the accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant."' 89 The
Court noted that dying declarations were an accepted exception to the confrontation
right and held that the admission of former testimony from the defendant's previous
trial on the same matter did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
190
Mattox does support Crawford, but how much credence should be given to
Mattox's conclusions? Mattox was written more than a century after ratification of the
Sixth Amendment, and that Court did not have more knowledge of the Framers' intent
than we do today. The Court presented its assertions as merely self-evident
propositions. It gave its conclusions about the primary object and the proper
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause without supporting references. 191 While
written by a person who was not dead but had moved to Missouri. Id. The court found that the introduction of
the books violated the defendant's right under the state's constitutional guarantee of confrontation. Id. at 76-
77. The court noted that dying declarations were an exception to that right of confrontation in homicide cases
because of the maxim, "no man shall take advantage of his own wrong." Id. at 76. The court also noted
former testimony could be admitted consistently with the confrontation right when the declarant was dead.
Thomas, 64 N.C. at 76. The court continued, however, that those exceptions to the right of confrontation did
not justify the admission of the books: "We are satisfied that the entries were not admissible, on proof of [the
declarant's] absence from the State." Id. at 77.
186. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (listing various grounds of unavailability in addition to the death of the
declarant).
187. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242.
188. Id. at 243.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 243-44.




Mattox does indicate that a Court a century after the Constitution's formation had
similar views to Crawford as to the meaning of the confrontation right, it does not shed
light on the Clause's original meaning or its text.
Furthermore, Mattox's other holding has now been rejected. The accused had
sought to impeach one of the former-testimony declarants by presenting witnesses to
show that after testifying, the declarant had made statements repudiating his
inculpatory testimony.192 The Court noted the evidentiary rule "that, before a witness
can be impeached by proof that he has made statements contradicting or differing from
the testimony given by him upon the stand, a foundation must be laid by interrogating
the witness himself as to whether he has ever made such statements." 193 The defendant
could not do this since the declarant made the inconsistent assertions after the first trial,
and the declarant was dead by the second.19 4 The Court stated that while enforcing the
evidentiary rule when the declarant is dead
may work an occasional hardship by depriving the party of the opportunity
of proving the contradictory statements, a relaxation of the rule in such cases
would offer a temptation to perjury, and the fabrication of testimony, which,
in criminal cases especially, would be almost irresistible .... The fact that
one party has lost the power of contradicting his adversary's witness is really
no greater hardship to him than the fact that his adversary has lost the
opportunity of recalling his witness and explaining his testimony .... There
is quite as much danger of doing injustice to one party by admitting such
testimony as to the other by excluding it.195
Given the possibility of injustice being inflicted upon the prosecution or the
accused, the accused here had to bear the unfairness and could not introduce the
impeaching evidence. This branch of Mattox has not stood the test of time. Indeed,
today the exclusion of the inconsistent statements would probably violate the accused's
compulsory process rights as Washington v. Texas19 6 indicates.
Washington held that Texas statutes prohibiting an accused from presenting the
testimony of persons charged or convicted as coparticipants in the same crime for
which the accused is being tried violated the Compulsory Process Clause. 197 The trial
court did not allow Washington to present the testimony of Charles Fuller, who
apparently would have given exculpatory testimony, because of Fuller's prior
conviction for his role in the murder.19 8 The rationale for this evidentiary prohibition
was basically the same one presented in Mattox to prohibit the impeachment, that is, to
reduce the temptation of perjured testimony. 9 9 Washington noted that the rule before
it "rested on the unstated premises that the right to present witnesses was subordinate to
the court's interest in preventing perjury, and that erroneous decisions were best
avoided by preventing the jury from hearing any testimony that might be perjured, even
192. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244-45.
193. Id. at 245.
194. Id. at 244-45.
195. Id. at 250.
196. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
197. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
198. Id. at 16-17.
199. Id. at 20-21.
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if it were the only testimony available on a crucial issue." 200  Washington, however,
found Texas's categorical exclusion of evidence to be arbitrary and in violation of the
right of compulsory process because the jury could have properly evaluated the
testimony.20 1 If the exclusion of the impeaching evidence offered in Mattox were
challenged today, it, too, should be found to violate the Compulsory Process Clause as
an arbitrary, categorical exclusion of defense evidence. Just as a jury can understand
the bias of a co-defendant testifying for the accused, 20 2 jurors can understand the
dangers of a claimed inconsistent statement from an absent declarant.
The Court has not had to grapple with the constitutionality of this impeachment
issue because modem evidence law admits such evidence, a course the Supreme Court
charted less than two years after Mattox. In Carver v. United States,20 3 the trial court
admitted dying declarations against the accused, but prevented the accused from
proving that the declarant made statements inconsistent with the admitted evidence. 2°4
The Court stated, "Whether these statements were admissible as dying declarations or
not is immaterial, since we think they were admissible as tending to impeach the
declaration of the deceased .... -205 Carver acknowledged that a party normally must
lay a foundation for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements and that Mattox
had enforced that rule.20 6 The Court, however, concluded:
We are not inclined to extend [Mattox] to the case of a dying declaration,
where the defendant has no opportunity by cross-examination to show that
by reason of mental or physical weakness, or actual hostility felt toward him,
the deceased may have been mistaken....
As these [dying] declarations are necessarily ex parte, we think the
defendant is entitled to the benefit of any advantage he may have lost by the
want of an opportunity for cross-examination. 20 7
200. Id. at21.
201. See infra notes 227-44 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Washington.
202. Id.
203. 164 U.S. 694 (1897).
204. Carver, 164 U.S. at 696-97.
205. Id. at 697.
206. Id. at 698.
207. Id. at 698. Although it did not overrule Mattox, Carver's logic undercut it; Carver concluded that
Mattox rested "upon the ground that the witness had once been examined and cross-examined upon a former
trial." Id. at 698. But in concluding that Carver's impeaching evidence should have been admitted to help
make up for the lost cross-examination, doubt was cast on Mattox's rationale. Carver, 164 U.S at 698. The
impeaching statements Mattox offered came after his opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mattox, 156
U.S. at 240. Without the introduction of the impeaching statements, Mattox lost the opportunity to present an
important part of his defense, just as Carver did. Cf FED. R. EvID. 806 advisory committee's note:
The force of Mattox, where the hearsay was the former testimony of a deceased witness and the
denial of use of a subsequent inconsistent statement was upheld, is much diminished by Carver,
where the hearsay was a dying declaration and denial of use of a subsequent inconsistent statement
resulted in reversal. The difference in the particular brand of hearsay seems unimportant when the
inconsistent statement is a subsequent one. True, the declarant is not totally deprived of cross-
examination when the hearsay is former testimony or a deposition, but he is deprived of cross-
examining on the statement or along lines suggested by it. Mr. Justice Shim, with two justices
joining him, dissented vigorously in Mattox.
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Evidence law has followed Carver and permits impeachment of hearsay declarants, 20 8
and thus, the issue of whether the exclusion of such impeaching evidence violates the
Compulsory Process Clause does not arise.
Evolving evidence law has rejected one of Mattox's holdings, and that holding is
probably unconstitutional today. Of course, this does not mean that its other holding
was wrong, but since those conclusions about the Confrontation Clause were presented
without analysis or foundation, it is not clear why Mattox should be given weight
today. Instead, just as its impeachment portion can be seen as a relic of its time, so,
too, can its constitutional analysis, a position buttressed by examining another Sixth
Amendment interpretation from that era.
C. Jury Size and the Common Law
Three years after Mattox, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution required a
twelve-person jury. In Thompson v. Utah,20 9 a jury of twelve in the Utah territory
convicted the defendant for calf-rustling, but he won a new trial.210 Utah gained
statehood, and Thompson was retried in the state court by a jury of eight as provided
for by Utah law.2 1 The Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial applied in the territorial courts and that, whatever the normal powers of the
state, any trial for a crime committed before statehood had to provide a jury consistent
with the Federal Constitution. 212 The Court then said that at the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the common law required twelve jurors, and therefore the Sixth Amendment
required a jury of the same size:
[T]he next inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the original Constitution
and in the Sixth Amendment is a jury constituted, as it was at common law,
of twelve persons, neither more nor less. This question must be answered in
the affirmative.... [T]he word "jury" and the words "trial by jury" were
placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the meaning
affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at the time
of the adoption of that instrument; ... the supreme law of the land required
that [Thompson] should be tried by a jury composed of not less than twelve
persons ....
208. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 806 (permitting the impeachment of hearsay declarants). This Rule
specifically rejects the ruling in Mattox by saying, "Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any
time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant
may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." FED. R. EVID. 806. The advisory committee note
to this Rules states: "The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness.
His credibility should in fairness be subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact testified."
FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note. Cf John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real
Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191,
261 (1999) ("The process outlined in Rule 806 is more than a rule of evidence; the process is an essential
component of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront hearsay.").
209. 170 U.S. 343 (1898), overruled by Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
210. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 344.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 350-51.
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... [T]he wise men who framed the Constitution of the United States and
the people who approved it were of opinion that life and liberty, when
involved in criminal prosecutions, would be not adequately secured except
through the unanimous verdict of twelve jurors.213
When, however, in 1970 the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the number of
jurors the Sixth Amendment required, it took a different view of the Framers' intent.
Williams v. Florida214 concluded that the common law at the time of the Constitution's
adoption mandated twelve-person juries, but it rejected the "easy assumption" that the
Sixth Amendment constitutionalized that common-law requirement: "While 'the intent
of the Framers' is often an elusive quarry, the relevant constitutional history casts
considerable doubt on the easy assumption in our past decisions that if a given feature
existed in a jury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily preserved in the
Constitution." 215  Doubt is cast on that assumption partly because "contemporary
legislative and constitutional provisions indicate that where Congress wanted to leave
no doubt that it was incorporating existing common-law features of the jury system, it
knew how to use express language to that effect. ' 21 6 This is illustrated by "the Seventh
Amendment, providing for jury trial in civil cases, [which] explicitly added that 'no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.' "217 Williams then came to what would
seem to be the obvious and commonsensical conclusion-we cannot really know today
what the Framers specifically intended in adopting the Sixth Amendment provision:
We do not pretend to be able to divine precisely what the word "jury"
imported to the Framers, the First Congress, or the States in 1789. It may
well be that the usual expectation was that the jury would consist of 12, and
that hence, the most likely conclusion to be drawn is simply that little
thought was actually given to the specific question we face today. But there
is absolutely no indication in "the intent of the Framers" of an explicit
decision to equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the
218
Since the Framers' intent concerning jury size was unknowable, the Court
concluded that a functional approach to the provision was the correct one and that
"[t]he relevant inquiry.., must be the function that the particular feature performs and
its relation to the purposes of the jury trial. '219
Williams raises a major question about the easy assumptions of Crawford and its
interpretive approach. The Court held that even though the common law clearly
required twelve-person juries and many of the Framers might have assumed that the
requirement would continue on, it could not be known that the Framers and adopters of
213. Id. at 349-53 (citations omitted).
214. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
215. Williams, 399 U.S. at 92-93.
216. Id. at 97.
217. Id.; cf Kirst, supra note 14, at 84 ("The Sixth Amendment's contrast with the Seventh Amendment
is evidence that the Framers did not use language clearly intended to preserve the right of confrontation as it
then existed in English common law.").
218. Williams, 399 U.S. at 98-99.
219. Id. at 99-100.
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the Bill of Rights specifically intended to constitutionalize that specific jury feature. 220
If that cannot be known, how can there be such certitude that the Sixth Amendment
constitutionalized the much more vague common law right of confrontation, if such a
right did exist? 221 Of course, Crawford pointed to nothing from the Framers that stated
they intended to constitutionalize a common-law right of confrontation. Crawford
merely asserted that the Confrontation Clause should be "most naturally read" that
way.222 However, Williams, in acknowledging that the Framers' specific intent cannot
now be specifically divined,223 took another interpretive course to effectuate the
Framers' broader intentions. In Williams, the Court looked to the Framers' goal in
constitutionalizing a right to a jury trial and then asked whether today twelve jurors
were necessary to further the underlying reasons for the jury trial right. 224 Crawford, of
course, not only failed to adopt this interpretive approach, it gave no explanation for
why it should be rejected. It simply ignored the rest of the Sixth Amendment and
interpreted confrontation as if it stood alone.225 While one could perhaps devise
reasons that would explain why confrontation should be interpreted differently from the
jury trial provision, such explanations are harder to fathom for different interpretive
standards for the conceptual twins of confrontation and compulsory process. And the
Court in interpreting the Compulsory Process Clause has clearly and consistently
rejected the approach expressed in Crawford and used standards much like those used
elsewhere in the Sixth Amendment.
226
V. THE INTERPRETATIVE STANDARD FOR COMPULSORY PROCESS
As discussed above, Washington v. Texas 227 found that a rule prohibiting co-
defendants from testifying for the accused violated the Sixth Amendment right to
220. Id. at 102-03.
221. Jonakait, supra note 14, at 227 ("Justice Scalia's research into English practices shows that English
courts argued over whether certain pieces of evidence could be admitted into criminal trials without cross-
examination, but he presents no information that some broader principle of 'confrontation' controlled these
decisions. A mind not already committed to finding a common-law right of confrontation might simply have
concluded that the English cases were only concerned with the admissibility of one kind of evidence, not a
general right. Today, for example, we can find many decisions about subsequent remedial measures. When
we read these cases, we don't find some general 'right' but simply conclude that a certain kind of evidence is
inadmissible. Justice Scalia, however, has assumed that the Confrontation Clause was incorporating a
common-law right of confrontation; therefore, there has to be an English common-law right of confrontation to
be discovered. The cited English cases are assumed to be the most relevant ones for determining that English
right, and then a right of confrontation is found in them. Without those assumptions, that right is not apparent.
If that English history is examined without a particular kind of American hindsight bias, it simply is not clear
that English common law at the time of our Bill of Right's adoption actually had a right of confrontation."
(internal footnotes omitted)).
222. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
223. Williams, 399 U.S. at 98.
224. Id. at 99-100.
225. See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text for discussion of Crawford's departure from
interpretation of Sixth Amendment provisions other than confrontation as in derogation of the common law at
framing.
226. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Compulsory Process Clause
interpretation and the need for the Confrontation Clause to be construed consistently.
227. 388 U.S. 14(1967).
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compulsory process.228 The Court's interpretation of the Compulsory Process Clause
not only employed a broad definition for "witnesses," it employed an interpretive
approach that cannot be reconciled with Crawford's.229
Washington concluded that the right to compulsory process guaranteed the
accused not only process for production of witnesses, but also a right to present their
testimony:
We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his ight to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor because the State
arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was
physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally
observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the
defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile
act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses
whose testimony he had no right to use.230
Of course, here again witnesses are not merely those who give testimony but those
who have personal knowledge about events that shed light on the defendant's guilt.
Washington, however, did not just employ a different definition of witness than
Crawford selected; it applied a conceptually different method of interpretation.
Washington explicitly found that compulsory process was not limited to the
common law rights at the time of the Sixth Amendment's adoption.23' Indeed, it is
quite clear that compulsory process in the framing era did not give an accused the right
to present testimony from co-defendants. 232 Washington noted that the common law at
the time of the Constitution's drafting prohibited testimony from certain people and
that "[d]efendants and codefendants were among the large class of witness disqualified
from testifying on the ground of interest. '233
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court upheld this ban on co-defendant
testimony in the face of a compulsory process claim. United States v. Reid234
recognized that the compulsory process guarantee granted criminal defendants the right
to produce witnesses, but the Court also concluded that the Sixth Amendment accepted
the rules of evidence in force in the states when the Constitution was adopted. 235 Since
228. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23; see supra text accompanying note 197 (stating that Washington v.
Texas invalidated Texas statutes prohibiting one co-defendant from testifying on behalf of another).
229. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
230. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23.
231. Id. at 18-20.
232. Id. at 20.
233. Id. at 20-21.
234. 53 U.S. 361 (1851).
235. Reid, 53 U.S. at 364-65. Justice Taney, writing for the Court, noted that early Americans had
partially adopted and partially rejected the English common law form of trials. Id. at 364. Trial by jury had
been protected in all the colonies, but English common law undercut this right by denying the accused
compulsory process. Id. Although English statutes had modified some of the more oppressive trial
restrictions,
the thirteen Colonies who united in the declaration of independence, as soon as they became states,
placed in their respective constitutions or fundamental laws, safeguards against the restoration of
proceedings which were so oppressive and odious while they remained in force. It was the people
of these thirteen states which formed the Constitution of the United States, and ingrafted on it the
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a criminal defendant then could not present evidence from one indicted with the
defendant, the accused did not have a right under the Compulsory Process Clause to
have a co-defendant testify for him.
236
The Court in 1918, however, effectively overruled Reid. In Rosen v. United
States,23 7 the Court noted that courts and legislatures had increasingly removed the
rules prohibiting classes of witnesses from testifying.238 The Court further stated,
[This change is due to the] conviction of our time that the truth is more
likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent
understanding who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a
case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the
jury or by the court, rather than by rejecting witnesses as incompetent ....
... [W]e conclude that the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789
should no longer be applied to such cases as we have here.... "
239
Washington stated that while Rosen was not decided on constitutional grounds,
"[I]ts reasoning was required by the Sixth Amendment. ' ' 240 The Compulsory Process
Clause is not ruled by the moribund grasp of eighteenth century common law. Instead,
the Court concluded that the Framers' purpose for compulsory process should control
modem interpretation. 241 Washington noted that their goal was to have confrontation
provision which secures the trial by jury, and abolishes the old common-law proceeding which had
so often been used for the purposes of oppression.
Id. Thus, in Justice Taney's view, while the Sixth Amendment did adopt the jury trial provision from England,
it did not adopt the English method of conducting such trials. Id. The source for the procedure at trial "could
not be the common law as it existed at the time of the emigration of the colonists, for the constitution had
carefully abrogated one of its most important provisions in relation to testimony which the accused might
offer." Reid, 53 U.S. at 365. Justice Taney concluded that the true source of the Sixth Amendment is found in
state law: "[T]he only known rule upon the subject which can be supposed to have been in the minds of the
men who framed these acts of Congress, was that which was then in force in the respective states, and which
they were accustomed to see in daily and familiar practice in the state courts." Id. at 265.
If the notice, right to counsel, and compulsory provisions of the Sixth Amendment were not adopting the
English common law, as Justice Taney's opinion suggests, but adopting procedures that the states were already
using when the Bill of Rights was framed, the same might be true for the right of confrontation. Id. at 364.
Interestingly, while Crawford referred to the 1858 Missouri case of State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431 (1858), to
support the proposition that the confrontation clause is most naturally read as incorporating the common law, it
did not refer to Reid, its own case from 1851, which, of course, suggests that Crawford's reading is not the
most natural one for the Sixth Amendment.
236. Reid, 53 U.S. at 365-66.
237. 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
238. Id. at 471-72.
239. Rosen, 245 U.S. at 471-72.
240. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. The Court in Washington continued:
In light of the common-law history, and in view of the recognition in the Reid case that the Sixth
Amendment was designed in part to make the testimony of a defendant's witnesses admissible on
his behalf in court, it could hardly be argued that a State would not violate the clause if it made all
defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law. It is difficult to see how the
Constitution is any less violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense
witnesses from testifying on the basis ofa priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.
Id.
241. Id. at 22-23.
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and compulsory process work together to -allow the accused to present a defense that
the jury could judge.242 Washington stated:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to
present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the
jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to
confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their
testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a
defense.
243
Under compulsory process, whether a constitutional violation has occurred is not
measured by ancient rules and practices, but instead by a modem understanding of
what it means to present a defense in our adversarial system.24 4
For example, it is clear that at common law an accused could not testify in his
defense. 245 Even though the common law forbade such testimony, the Compulsory
Process Clause, as Rock v. Arkansas246 concluded, now grants an accused the right to
testify.247 The accused has a modem right to testify because confrontation and
compulsory process together assure that an accused has the opportunity to be heard in
his own defense, and today an accused's right to testify is necessary to satisfy that
constitutional purpose.248 Compulsory process is not limited to the rights an accused
242. Id. at 22.
243. Id. at 19; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) ("Our cases establish, at a
minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance
of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before ajury evidence that might influence the determination
of guilt." (footnote omitted)); Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L.
REv. 1063, 1074 (1999) ("On its face, the Compulsory Process Clause does not speak specifically to the
admissibility of witness testimony. But both the Supreme Court and modem commentators have correctly
understood the Clause to bear upon questions of admissibility as well as the bringing of witnesses into court
under the compulsion of law.").
244. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988), stating:
[Compulsory process] is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself .... The right to
compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary
process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact.
The right to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment even though it is not
described in so many words.
See also Hoeffel, supra note 153, at 1277 ("The history of the Compulsory Process Clause ... demonstrates
that the purpose of the Clause was to allow for introduction of evidence by the accused through the adversarial
process.").
245. Maine was the first of the states to abolish this common law prohibition but not until 1859, and the
federal government did not permit such testimony until 1878. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577
(1961) ("The first statute was apparently that enacted by Maine in 1859 making defendants competent
witnesses in prosecutions for a few crimes.... A federal statute to the same effect was adopted in 1878.").
246. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
247. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 ("[The] Compulsory Process Clause ... grants a defendant the right to call
'witnesses in his favor' .... Logically included in the accused's right... is a right to testify himself .. ").
248. Cf Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment... or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth
Amendment,... the Constitution guarantees 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."'
(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (additional internal citations omitted))).
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had in 1789, but rather is controlled by the 6riginal goals and purposes for the
constitutional right, viewed with modem knowledge and experience.
VI. ORIGINALISM, TEXTUALISM, AND PRINCIPLED INTERPRETATION OF
CONFRONTATION AND COMPULSORY PROCESS
Confrontation and compulsory process are conceptual twins, each dealing with an
accused's trial relationship with witnesses, but Crawford249 has now adopted a much
different mode of interpretation for the Confrontation Clause from its companion. This
is not because Crawford's approach is a highly principled textualist and originalist
approach while the other approach is not.
As we have seen, the Confrontation Clause's text can explicate Crawford's
definition of "witnesses" as those who give testimony, but no textual analysis can lead
to the conclusion that "testimonial statements," a term that does not appear in the Sixth
Amendment, is limited to the equivalent of ex parte affidavits and depositions.250 One
has to go outside the Framers' words to reach that result. Moreover, the text supports
not just Crawford's derivation of the term "witnesses," but also a much broader
meaning that comports with all the other uses of that term in the Constitution.
Crawford seems to take an originalist approach in concluding that the common
law of 1789 controls the right of confrontation, but this, too, is misleading. The
contention that this is the most natural reading of the Clause is merely an unsupported
assertion. 251 The Framers' intentions for the confrontation provision were not stated
and are simply unknowable. Justice Scalia's conclusion simply ignored confrontation's
Sixth Amendment context, for other Sixth Amendment provisions not only failed to
adopt the existing common law, but in crucial ways rejected it.252
Some broader ramifications of Crawford should also be considered. If the same
standards should govern the conceptually linked compulsory process and confrontation
rights, then Crawford's interpretive approach to confrontation indicates that the Court's
standards for compulsory process are wrong. If Crawford's natural reading is correct,
then an accused today should not have a constitutional right under compulsory process
to be able to testify or to present evidence from those charged with him.
The consequences, however, could go further. Compulsory process and
confrontation are linked together, but they are also linked to the notice and right to
counsel provisions, all of which cumulatively guarantee the accused the right to present
a defense in our adversarial system. 253 Of course, casting doubt on Crawford's
approach, the right to counsel provision cannot be most naturally read as granting the
249. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
250. See supra Part II for a discussion of "witnesses" in the Constitution.
251. See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conclusory, unsupported
nature of the ostensibly natural reading.
252. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical reasoning of Reid
as to the Sixth Amendment's rejection of common law.
253. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the joint purposes of the
Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses.
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accused the common law rights of 1789' because that law did not grant that right to
counsel.
25 4
Still, however, Crawford's approach suggests that the right to counsel should be
limited to the constitutional protection as it existed in 1789. In essence, this is how the
Supreme Court once interpreted the right. Betts v. Brady 55 held that the indigent
accused was not entitled to appointed counsel, stressing that "[at the time of the
founding] the matter of appointment of counsel for defendants, if dealt with at all, was
dealt with by statute rather than by constitutional provision." 256  Gideon v.
Wainwright,257 of course, rejected Betts.258 Gideon acknowledged the historical data
collected in the earlier case, but in Gideon's view:
Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break with [the Court's] own well-considered
precedents.... Not only [those] precedents but also reason and reflection
require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
259
Thus, the dead hand of 1789 does not control the right to counsel. The goal of a fair
trial in our adversary system is viewed with modem reason and reflection. Crawford,
of course, suggests that Gideon's interpretive approach and outcome is wrong as it no
doubt suggests the same for many other present Sixth Amendment doctrines meant to
further the accused's right to present a defense in our adversary system.
2 60
On the other hand, the Court's approach to compulsory process, as well as to other
Sixth Amendment provisions, is not only a principled method of interpretation, it may
well capture the original intent for how the right should be interpreted.26' As Peter
Westen explains, Washington's interpretive method for compulsory process "is neither
unprincipled nor unsound. '262 The rules regarding the competency of witnesses were
changing in the eighteenth century, and Westen concludes:
254. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text, noting that Sixth Amendment guarantee of the
right to counsel was in derogation of the common law in 1789.
255. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
256. Betts, 316 U.S. at 467.
257. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
258. Id. at 339.
259. Id. at 344.
260. For example, the present right to the effective assistance of counsel is based not on eighteenth
century history but on modem notions of the right to a defense in our adversary system. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) ("The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to
produce just results.").
261. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), found that an evidence rule prohibiting the
introduction of polygraph evidence did not violate the Compulsory Process Clause and accepted the modem
interpretive approach to compulsory process by stating that categorical exclusionary "rules do not abridge an
accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to the purposes they
are designed to serve."' Id. at 308 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). Scheffer concluded
that because there is no modem consensus about the reliability of polygraph evidence, a rule prohibiting such
evidence is not arbitrary. Id. at 310.
262. Westen, supra note 152, at 114.
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There is no reason to believe that the framers intended to freeze the
defendant's constitutional rights forever in the form of rules already
undergoing change. It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended
instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law
without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task
of applying those principles in specific cases.
263
Confrontation presents a similar situation. Certainly the practices regarding
hearsay were evolving in England, especially at the time our Constitution was adopted.
T.P. Gallanis's survey of evidence treatises, case law, and newly available pamphlet
accounts of civil and criminal trials concludes that while the law of hearsay in England
showed little development between 1754 and 1780, "the 1780s were a period of
considerable activity, and ... by 1800 much of the modem approach to hearsay was
already in place." 264 He suggests that the impetus for the development of modem
notions of hearsay was increasingly aggressive lawyering in criminal cases and
concludes, "Only in the late eighteenth century, when a new spirit of adversarialism
appeared in criminal and then civil trials, did those rules and their consistent
application begin to mature. '265
Others also have come to the conclusion that the hearsay rules developed in
England as criminal defense attorneys, although prevented from providing full
representation in most criminal trials, were increasingly allowed to cross-examine
witnesses. 266 Such research suggests that the expansion of the hearsay rule occurred as
a means of empowering defense attorneys:
As effective use of cross-examination increased, its power became apparent
to both judges and lawyers. Counsel naturally sought to protect and expand
cross-examination opportunities. They protested denials of cross-
examination and objected more to hearsay.... The hearsay rule... acted as
a grant of power to defense advocates.
267
The English hearsay rule seems to have developed as trials became more
adversarial at the end of the nineteenth century. 268 If the development of the adversary
system brought about a similar evolution in evidentiary practices in America, notions
263. Id. at 114-15.
264. T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REv. 499, 551 (1999).
265. Id. at 551-52.
266. See, e.g., Stephen A. Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in
Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 534-36 (1990) (tracing the development of cross-
examination from inception in 1717 through significant expansion during 1730s).
267. Jonakait, Origins, supra note 168, at 91.
268. See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1937) (tracing
development to demonstrate hearsay rule was a product of adversary system). Cf 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra notes 79, § 6346, at 564:
[A]t the time of the American revolution, the relationship between confrontation, cross-examination,
and the hearsay rule was indistinct to the point of invisibility in the minds of Americans .... These
two evidentiary doctrines were themselves in a highly inchoate state, probably because while they
grew out of some of the same intellectual roots as confrontation, they are far more sophisticated
applications of those ideas and one would hardly expect to find them developing ahead of the far
more rudimentary concept of confrontation. Indeed, if forced to simplify, we would say that the
truth is probably... [that] the hearsay rule and the right to cross-examine witness were themselves
products of the right of confrontation rather than the other way around.
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of hearsay and cross-examination would have been in flux in the Constitution-framing
era. And since a strong adversarial system with vigorous defense advocacy at its core
was being institutionalized in America perhaps before it was in England, 269 hearsay law
and respect for cross-examination may have been developing even more rapidly here
than abroad.
270
We cannot say what hearsay law really was in the United States in 1789.271 We
cannot really say what the connection among hearsay, cross-examination, and the
Confrontation Clause was because nothing in the historical record of the framing or
ratification of the Sixth Amendment indicates what it was. We can say that the
provisions of the Sixth Amendment operating together constitutionalized a system
where the accused had the right to present a defense by providing for notice and
granting rights to counsel and confrontation. 272 No doubt that system, including its
evidentiary rules, was strongly evolving when the Bill of Rights was adopted. Under
these circumstances, as was the case for compulsory process, 273 it is unlikely that the
Framers were attempting to freeze into the Constitution a particular moment of the
common law that related to confrontation. Instead, the task for those interpreting the
Confrontation Clause should be, as it has been for the Compulsory Process Clause, to
apply the Framers' goals with modem reason and experience, and there is as much
reason to think that was the original intention of the Confrontation Clause as any
269. For a discussion of the emergence of a more complete adversary system in America earlier than in
England, see Jonakait, Origins, supra note 168, at 94-108. The states and the Sixth Amendment granted a
right to counsel then unknown in England and institutionalized a public prosecutor, also unknown in England.
Id. at 94-95. The adversary system was another part of American government through checks and balances
that also empowered individuals to act in their own self-interest. For an early example of the American
adversary system, see State v. Negro George, 2 Del. Cas. 88, 1797 WL 403 (Del. Quart. Sess. Nov. 21, 1797),
where a slave was charged with raping a white woman. Defense counsel effectively cross-examined
prosecution witnesses and presented witnesses of their own to establish that the accused had been mistakenly
identified, which counsel argued to the jury. Id. at *2. The jury acquitted. Id. at *3. See also State v. Wells, I
N.J.L. 486, 1790 WL 349 (N.J. Sep. Term 1790) (illustrating defense counsel's unsuccessful challenge
evidence, including hearsay, and failure to convince jury that homicide was excusable).
270. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103 (I Hayw. 1794) ("It is a rule of the common law, founded on
natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine
..... "); see also Respublica v. Langcake, I Yeates 415, 1795 WL 708, at *2 (Pa. Jan. 1795) ("The general rule
was, that hearsay was inadmissible, but there were some exceptions in particular cases, and among others the
declarations of the deceased person on an indictment for murder. No such necessity could be pretended here,
there have been several witnesses present at the different transactions."); United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas.
825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16175). The court in Robins held:
[When the witness] knows nothing but by hearsay.., he at once comes within that description of
testimony, which the laws of England, and the best decisions of the best judges, and our laws
borrowed from them, forbid either a judge or a jury to receive in any case affecting the life or limb
of a subject of the one, or a citizen of the other.
Id. at 837.
271. See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, § 6387, at 791 (stating that "[miost of those who offer
theories about confrontation and hearsay rely on an unproven assumption; that is, that the hearsay rule in
America was the same as the hearsay rule in England").
272. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text for discussion of the need to read Sixth Amendment
as a whole in discerning scope of constitutional right of accused to present a defense.
273. See supra note 260 and accompanying text for a discussion of how it was unlikely that the Framers
intended to embrace then-current common law entirely.
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other.274 It may not be easy, but it is the task that the Court has set out for itself in
interpreting compulsory process. Since compulsory process and confrontation should
be interpreted together, either confrontation interpretation should follow that same path,
or the right of compulsory process should revert to the rights of the accused under the
common law when the Sixth Amendment was adopted.
CONCLUSION
A textual analysis can lead to Crawford's conclusion that "witnesses" in the
Confrontation Clause means those who give testimony, but such an analysis does not
lead to the conclusion that "testimony" only refers to statements akin to ex parte
depositions and affidavits. Textual analysis, however, also leads "witnesses" to mean
those who have personal knowledge of a relevant event or those who give evidence or
proof, and these broader definitions include all hearsay declarants. These latter
definitions, but not the former, are consistent with all the other uses of the term in the
Constitution.
Crawford's analysis ignores confrontation's Sixth Amendment context. Sixth
Amendment provisions reject the common law and their interpretation is fundamentally
different from Crawford's method of interpreting confrontation. If Crawford's method
is correct, much Sixth Amendment doctrine, especially that of the Compulsory Process
Clause, is at stake. If, however, the interpretive standards for other Sixth Amendment
provisions are right, then Crawford's approach to the Confrontation Clause is wrong.
274. See 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 79, § 6347, at 792 ("[It is a mistake to assume] that history
provides a key that will open the door to the answers to the modem application of the right of confrontation.
In our view, history provides not an easy answer but a challenge; can we apply the values of the Revolutionary
generation in a world that is much different from the one they knew?").
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